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One of the central goals of this Symposium was to present analysis and
commentary by scholars known for their independent thinking and reluctance
to ride trends merely because they are trendy. In this panel, that tendency is
evident as Professors Subrin, Brunet, Carrington, and Stemlight all make points
many would find contrarian. In my contribution to this portion of the Sympo-
sium, I hope merely to add some modest insights to their work and to articulate
what I believe to be common threads, not only of their comments, but also of
the dispute resolution movement generally.
I. SUBRIN's GRADUAL SEMI-CONVERSION: A SURPRISING PASSAGE TO
REAFFIRMING A TRADITIONALIST CANON
A. Subrin's "Conversion" and Case for Mediation
Professor Subrin is a self-professed traditionalist who has been one of the
most forceful defenders of what I might term neo-traditional "Clarkian" litiga-
tion. By that, I mean the model of civil disputing in which litigation is a pri-
mary vehicle. More important, the litigation is based on notice pleading, broad
discovery, and a preference for adjudication on the merits.1
Key Subrin works over the years have focused on the historical path of the
Clarkian model, which served to fuel much of the law revolution of the mid-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law. Thanks to the Symposium
participants, Law Journal staff, Dean Richard Morgan, and the Boyd School of Law for their
contributions to the Symposium. Additional thanks go to Mike and Sonja Saltman, Ann
McGinley, and Carl Tobias. Preparation of this commentary was supported by a grant from
the James E. Rogers Research Fund.
1 The term "Clarkian" also connotes the view of civil litigation generally associated with
Yale Law School Dean and Second Circuit Judge Charles Clark, who was the Reporter of
the initial Advisory Committee on the Federal Civil Rules and is generally regarded as the
primary author of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 983 (1986) (describing development of the Federal Rules
and Clark's key role). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (providing extensive background of the judicial reform move-
ment of the early Twentieth Century that led to the 1934 Act and the promulgation of the
1938 Civil Rules).
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Twentieth Century, to the "new era" of civil procedure and dispute resolution
that dominated the last quarter of the Twentieth Century.2 Like others in what
might be termed this "camp" of scholars, 3 Subrin has long defended the Clar-
kian model and championed it as a source of fairness, equality and social jus-
tice. But Subrin's eclecticism distinguishes him from others, as does his
current cautious embrace of mediation cum "medigation." 4
In his article for this Symposium,5 this eclecticism reveals itself in a will-
ingness to accept many aspects of the modem ADR movement of which he had
previously been wary. But here again, Subrin is not a complete convert.
Although no longer a "high church" member of the litigation synod of dispute
resolution theology, neither has he become Pentecostal. Rather, he is reformist.
He accepts many of the arguable benefits of ADR, particularly mediation, with-
out making a complete conversion away from the traditional legal model. Like
a religious moderate, Subrin has a view of law that combines both old and new
and sees value and synergy in both. In the end, he concludes that Clarkian
adjudication and nouveau ADR can indeed successfully co-exist, if only zealots
from one camp do not overrun those of the other camp.6
In his impressionist but empirically accurate portrayal of these develop-
ments, Subrin describes the process of mediation being encouraged by the
shadow of legal adjudication.7 More important, Subrin has probably correctly
2 See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993); Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Proce-
dure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981).
3 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK L. REV. 659, 688-90
(1993) (dividing commentators into "preservationists" seeking to maintain "open courts"
ethos of Clarkian era and "reformers" who view increased controls on court access, stream-
lined processes, and strictures on substantive legal rights as necessary to maintain functional
disputing system). Perhaps most prominent in this camp is Judith Resnik. See, e.g., Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Many
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO Sr. J.
ON Disp. REsOL. 211 (1995). By way of full disclosure, I probably should admit to falling
within this group of defenders of the Clarkian model. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Con-
tracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 965
(1998) [hereinafter Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Dis-
torted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Ver-
dict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (criticizing Supreme Court
decisions making summary judgment easier to attain and making trial less likely).
' In an earlier draft of his article, Subrin coined the term "medigation" to describe the opera-
tion of mediation as an adjunct part of the litigation process. A case is filed and pending,
requiring the mediation (either by court order or in an attempt to resolve the dispute short of
further adjudication). In the final version of his article, Subrin backs away from using
"medigation" as a word, undoubtedly because of his strong sense of linguistic propriety. Not
sharing that same commitment (or perhaps because I daydreamed at a crucial moment in
eighth grade English class), I wish he had continued to use the term. "Medigation" may be a
bit awkward or cute for some tastes, but it does quite a good job of describing the manner in
which mediation and litigation have come to travel in tandem in recent years.
5 Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better
Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003).
6 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 214-15.
7 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 221.
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explained the reasons for the trend. In addition, I agree with Subrin that media-
tion has worked pretty well. Its ascension has generally been a good thing,
improving dispute resolution without substantial erosion of the traditional adju-
dicative model.8
However, as Subrin notes, and as I will discuss in this comment, media-
tion (both private and court-annexed) and other forms of ADR (both private
and court-annexed) must be utilized with some caution by the participants and
supervised by the courts in order to minimize potential negative side effects on
the overall quality of American dispute resolution.
Subrin deserves particular praise for setting forth succinctly and persua-
sively an insightful, factually accurate, and understandable narrative about the
rise of mediation.9 Subrin's explanation of the reasons for the modem media-
tion boom, are, in my view, insightful and correct. The ascendancy of media-
tion stems not only from the perceived crowded shortcomings of courts but also
because mediation's less absolutist approach fits well with post-modem philo-
sophical trends. It also fits with modem market-oriented trends in business and
regulation and comports with the prevailing political ideology of the time,
which favors privatization over government programs. Mediation has the
appeal of bringing greater privatization and self-selection to the dispute resolu-
tion process, something of a market-based approach to dispute resolution. It
also presents the prospect of individually tailored dispute resolution that can be
more creative than adjudication, as well as more volitional.
Subrin also restates briefly the conventional wisdom that mediation and
other forms of ADR are significantly less expensive than litigation. ° It is a bit
unfair to suggest that discovery exists primarily as a lawyer's fee-generating
toy. Despite all the complaints about discovery, disputants sure seem to want
it. Frequently, perhaps usually, effective mediation or medigation cannot take
place without at least some discovery or court-mandated disclosure to provide
the disputants with enough reliable information to form a basis for mediation.
8 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 198 (responding to and largely refuting several criticisms of
mediation or mediation in combination with litigation).
I See Subrin, supra note 5, at 211 (discussing development of modern mediation).
10 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 204-05. In an earlier draft of his article, Subrin included an
amazing comment attributed to noted attorney Whitney North Seymour, who eulogized
Charles Clark for providing lawyers with the "gift of discovery" that had "enriched the
practising bar." Like the term "medigation," I wish the Seymour reference had survived to
the final version of the Subrin article because it has considerable illustrative power as well as
a point for discussion. Although I do not disagree with any particular vehemence, I want to
at least note for the record that the amount of any cost savings from ADR has not been
established with any reliability. A baroque mediation or arbitration can cost a lot of money,
just as does a baroque trial.
In addition, in my continuing (but probably forlorn) quest to defend discovery when it
becomes the whipping boy of choice for those attacking litigation (see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery
"Reform", 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (2001)), 1 have to take some issue with Seymour.
Discovery costs money and raises legal fees - but so do motions, particularly summary
judgment motions (which have become much more popular with lawyers since the Supreme
Court began encouraging more of them). Additionally, so does the basic investigation that
would need to take place in the absence of discovery or that routinely accompanies discov-
ery. Enforcing ADR agreements and engaging in ADR costs money, and it often comes in
addition to litigation costs rather than in lieu of litigation.
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There is also disagreement as to the degree to which different aspects of dis-
covery contribute to escalation of litigation costs. Paul Carrington once in con-
versation suggested to me that depositions were the primary culprit. My own
experience as a litigator was that depositions (including preparation) did not
account for nearly as much time and expense (either individually or collec-
tively) as did (sometimes excessive) document review, legal research, motion
practice, or discovery battles (e.g., negotiating over discovery; seeking discov-
ery or relief from discovery from the court, etc.). However, there is a lurking
question not really addressed in the Subrin paper or most articles on mediation
or other ADR efforts utilizing a third party neutral. Granted, mediation has the
attributes noted by Subrin that make it popular - but negotiation does as well,
without the presence of the third party neutral. Why has mediation become the
darling of popular ADR while negotiation appears to be less in the focus by
legislatures, courts, and commentators? I return to this query at the end of my
commentary.
Subrin appears to have become more receptive to ADR as he has become
less optimistic (or more pessimistic) about litigation. In his article, he appears
to regard some of the "justice" and "equity" (meaning equitable treatment
rather than the technical equitable injunctive relief often found in litigation)
arguments in support of litigation as unattainable castles-in-the-air. Although
he is perhaps correct, this still, to an extent, begs the question of why the litiga-
tion system has not been completely successful at attaining social equity" or
total justice. Is it because courts are inherently limited in this regard? If so,
this would suggest we should accept the limitations, embrace ADR for any
efficiencies or opportunities for creative solutions it may offer, and move on.
But what if the shortcomings of litigation exist because we have been
unwilling to invest sufficient resources or will in making adjudication achieve
its potential? If so, this would suggest that we should consider improving liti-
gation and adjudication insofar as feasible before engrafting too much ADR
into the litigation system. Medigation may not be a bad thing but neither is it
necessarily the optimal thing.
Interestingly, Subrin's modest epiphany (from litigation traditionalist Saul
to moderate mediationophile Paul)' 2 and embrace of ADR leads him to recom-
mend with vigor that judges adhere to their traditional role and simply try cases
(or, perhaps more precisely, make prompt and crisp pretrial decisions that will
move litigation along toward adjudication). As Subrin put it most pithily at the
Symposium, the ADR revolution teaches us "judges should judge."' 3 By main-
taining an adjudicatory role, judges will create the "shadow of the law"' 14 and
l" By "social equity" I mean equitable treatment of society's members by the courts and the
social system, not a forced equality among participants or a parity of outcomes.
12 See The Acts of the Apostles 9:3-18 as recounted in the BIBLE, describing the conversion
of Saul, persecutor of Christians, into the apostle Paul. Although Subrin is something of a
reformed traditionalist, his conversion, of course, is not nearly so great nor dramatic as that
of Saul to Paul.
'3 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 227.
"4 The term, now essentially part of the mainstream vocabulary of dispute resolution, is
taken from Mnookin and Komhauser's article, which set forth in print the insight intrinsi-
cally held by lawyers: disputing parties negotiate against a backdrop of the likely range of
results if the matter is fully adjudicated at law. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
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default system of dispute resolution that will best enable alternative dispute
resolution in all its forms to flourish (including the most common and optimal
but judicially and academically overlooked mode of dispute resolution - nego-
tiation - but more on this later in this comment).
Because mediation and other forms of ADR appear to have worked well
when performed by persons other than judges, judges should recognize and
appreciate this and try cases rather than trying to be mediators as well. This
part of Subrin's paper, to a degree, meshes with Professor Edward Brunet's
paper15 in that Brunet's "judicial signaling" is a real judicial task and not quasi-
mediation. As detailed in the Brunet paper and discussed below, a judge
engaging in judicial signaling is making a non-binding, non-final, partial evalu-
ation of the legal and factual strength of the claims and defenses in the case and
communicating this to the parties.
In effect, the judge is offering a preview of likely adjudication outcomes.
This is far different than a judge attempting to entangle herself in the dispute as
mediator. Consequently, I view Subrin's suggestion that "judges judge" as per-
fectly consistent with Brunet's view that it does not violate the judicial role for
courts to engage in a constrained amount of judicial signaling.
During the course of his article, Subrin appears to agree with the oft-made
charge that much ADR scholarship has been fluffy, overly romantic about
ADR, or vague in its observations and prescriptions.' 6 The point to me seems
inarguable. Much too much ADR scholarship has the tone of cultist conver-
sion, religious fervor, or infatuation with all that is not litigation. 7 Subrin
observes that what may strike a traditionalist as indeterminacy in ADR writings
and initiatives may be inevitable because ADR, particularly mediation, is inher-
ently a less determinative process than litigation. Subrin also wisely sees that
mediation and other forms of ADR are not necessarily bound by the perhaps
unrealistic ardor of some of their proponents. Rather, mediation in practice
may exhibit effective pragmatism even though much of the literature of media-
tion and ADR is almost Pollyannish in its unalloyed optimism-cum-booster-
ism.1" Subrin's work, like the recent work of other litigation and ADR
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979). See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREE-
MENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the concept of BATNA, the
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, which may range from formal litigation to
walking away from a conflict).
15 See Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2003).
16 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 198-99.
11 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology,
2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247, 251-56 (arguing that much of the endorsement of ADR has been
excessively uncritical and driven more by ideological support for ADR concepts rather than
rational analysis of operation of ADR, particularly in the ongoing scholarly debate over what
comprise "appropriate" styles of mediation).
18 See Stempel, supra note 17, at 247 (mediation in practice is more elective and pragmatic
than as preached by many of its advocates; in particular, real world mediation appears to
utilize reference to legal standards and evaluation of the claims and defenses more than is
acknowledged or accepted by many mediation advocates). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Con-
cept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949 (1997) (same); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Medi-
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scholars, suggests that the legal profession is better off addressing the prag-
matic operational questions of mediation and other disputing devices rather
than arguing over what constitutes "true" or "acceptable" mediation.19
B. The Psychology of Settlement
Subrin is also almost certainly correct in his assessment of why lawyers
settle cases: to achieve an acceptable negotiated (or mediated) resolution in the
face of uncertainty as to the likely litigation outcome. Where such uncertainty
is high, attorneys will generally be more inclined toward settlement, unless the
stakes are extremely small and/or a party wishes to manage the dispute as part
of a larger economic, adjudicative, or commercial strategy. Where uncertainty
is relatively low, this may of course also aid settlement by making it easier to
draw up the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA in the vernacular of negotiation
jargon) 0 bounded by fairly clear default legal rules and seemingly apparent
facts. But low uncertainty may also reduce incentive to settle, at least for the
party with the stronger litigation position, by making that party less likely to
give an uncertainty discount to opponents.
Subrin's observations on this point also raise what are, for me, interesting
questions: is uncertainty in general increasing or decreasing? Are the effects of
uncertainty becoming more asymmetric? That is, do uncertainty effects or cer-
tainty effects weigh more heavily on some classes of disputants than others?
Does any such asymmetry enhance or impede opportunities for negotiated dis-
pute resolution?
To illustrate, many observers have seen the past twenty to thirty years as
something of a counter-revolution against the perceived "liberal" revolution in
litigation that took place at mid-century (approximately 1938-1970) with eased
requirements of pleading, expanded discovery, strong likelihood of jury consid-
eration, and increased capacity to expand the scope of the lawsuit through
devices such as the class action and liberal joinder. Among the steps in the
counter-revolution have been increased availability of summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law; more constrained discovery, and heightened barri-
ers to receipt of expert witness testimony."
To the extent that these "legal" developments strengthen the position of a
given class of litigants (e.g., defendants), this may either impede resolution by
making these litigants more willing to (I use the term advisedly in light of the
location of the Symposium and its journal of publication) "gamble" on contin-
ation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 371 (suggesting that mediation styles and
appropriateness for particular disputes is better assessed according to factors other than the
bilateral inquiry, found in much of the literature, as to whether mediator is purely "facilita-
tive" or whether mediator offers "evaluative" observations).
19 See, e.g., Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 309, 319; John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 321.
20 See FISHER & URY, supra note 14, at 66-76.
21 See Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts, supra note 3 (discussing these factors
and arguable trends of civil disputing, noting commentary of others to this effect but also
noting scholars with different perspectives); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal
Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659 (1993) (same).
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ued litigation or trial in expectation of victory. Or, the "settlement value" of
claims may have declined relative to the resources of the advantaged class of
litigants.
This, of course, is a distributional point rather than a procedural or dispute
resolution point as such. The relative success of different disputants may seem
unimportant when compared to the overarching ADR inquiry of whether dis-
putes are getting resolved, how quickly they are getting resolved, and how
much judicial intervention is required. That, to some extent, is my point - even
if it is a point arguably outside the scope of Subrin's paper. If the legal profes-
sion and the body politic become too absorbed in the narrow question of
removing disputes from courts or making dispute resolution an end in itself,
sight of arguably greater goals - accuracy, justice, fairness, compliance with
the law - has been lost, or at least blurred. I would prefer that study of ADR
not take excessive precedence over study of whether recent procedural and evi-
dentiary changes have made the "playing field" of dispute resolution too une-
ven among classes of litigants.
C. Subrin on the Possible Impact of Gender on Dispute Resolution
Subrin also makes an interesting, although perhaps politically incorrect as
well as difficult to prove, observation that there is a partial sociological expla-
nation for the rise of settlement. He, in essence, is asserting that women are
better at facilitating settlement (oink?) and that, as women have become more
prevalent and prominent in the legal profession during the past thirty years, a
greater number and proportion of attorneys are now more temperamentally
suited to successfully effecting dispute resolution. 2
Subrin's "woman is the settler of the world" argument obviously goes
beyond the scope of this Symposium and merits more significant study and
debate. My own amateur, armchair sociologist's view is that he is on to some-
thing. The women attorneys with whom I have dealt over the past twenty years
have, in my experience, been less saddled with some attorney traits that impede
dispute resolution: ego; inappropriate competitiveness; insensitivity; an almost
pathological need to appear tough (or to pretend to appear tough), particularly
when posturing for clients. At the risk of opening another academic can of
worms, my own view is that women attorneys are less linear and more flexible
in their thinking and approach to cases, which both facilitates creativity in the
combat aspects of litigation and in the cooperative dispute resolution corollaries
to litigation. Women counsel may be more sensitive to the relationships of the
disputants and the relational aspects of the case. This view, most prominently
22 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 207-08.
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noted in the academic work of Carol Gilligan,23 has been both controversial 24
and widely accepted.2 5
Although recent legal scholarship may contain less self-conscious discus-
sion of these issues than during the 1980s and 1990s, the notion of gender-
based differences in attorney and disputant orientation remains.26 My personal
view is that there is a "there, there", to reverse and paraphrase Gertrude Stein's
famous put-down of Oakland.27 However, there also is nothing resembling
systematic study or reliable data on the matter.
Further, if law and policy analysis accepts feminist notions of difference in
attorney behavior, it must not only look at the seemingly positive attributes of
feminist lawyering (e.g., more resolution, less warfare) but also consider the
potential dark side of this different voice of ADR. For example, is it possible
that women attorneys and third-party neutrals focus on protection of relational
interests to an extent that it undervalues legal rights and gives some parties a
settlement that is not advantageous? Put another way, do female counsel leave
too much on the table when negotiating (oink, oink)? Are they too accommo-
dating of authority? Is this true, even if it may, on balance, bring better results
for a client than the "often wrong but never in doubt" attitude of the perhaps
caricatured macho male attorney? Client interests surely can be sacrificed to
the interests of cocksure counsel. But, on the other hand, are "hensure
' 28
23 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
24 See, e.g., CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST Boys: How MISGUIDED FEMI-
NISM is HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN (2000); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMI-
NISM? (1994); Kimberly M Schuld, Rethinking Educational Equity: Sometimes, Different
Can Be an Acceptable Substitute for Equal, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461 (challenging, even
attacking, aspects of Gilligan's research, conclusions, and thesis as well as other feminist
writings concerned with lower value attached to female modes of thought and marginaliza-
tion of women in educational institutions).
25 Gilligan's work has been cited in more than a thousand law review articles, usually by
legal or social scholars who are in general agreement with her thesis as to the different
cognitive orientations of men and women.
26 Although clearly outside the scope of this comment and the Symposium, one might con-
sider a systematic study of the influence of Gilligan's work and the trend of the debate. My
informal impression was that In a Different Voice made a big splash when it was published
but has dissipated in influence. Limited empirical examination suggests my impression may
be erroneous. According to a survey of the LEXIS law review database (conducted Sept. 25,
2002), Gilligan was cited only seventy-eight times during the law review literature of the
1980s but was cited 830 times during the 1990s and 204 times during the Twenty-First
Century. Apparently, the different voice remains vibrant in its hold on legal scholars. See
also BAILEY KuKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 20-22 (1994) (discussing origin and influence of
Gilligan's work on ethical theory as well as feminism).
27 Gertrude Stein provided what is probably the ultimate urban easterner's put down of the
modern cities of the American West when she described Oakland by stating there was "no
there, there." See BARTLET-r's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 627 (Justin Kaplan ed., 1992) Stein's
comment is frequently, but apparently erroneously, described as pertaining to Los Angeles.
This may also reflect the degree to which non-westerners think it's all the same west of the
Mississippi (or even the Hudson). See also Susan Silbey, The Emperor's New Clothes:
Mediation, Mythology and Markets, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 171, 174, n.6 (invoking Stein's
bon mot).
28 At the risk of excessive stereotyping, I borrow the phrase from D.H. Lawrence's essay,
Cocksure Men and Hensure Women, D.H. Lawrence, Cocksure Women and Hensure Men,
in SEX, LITERATURE AND CENSORSHIP, 46, 46-47 (Harry T. Moore, Ed., 1959). Although no
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female counsel too unwilling to press a claim in the face of a certain but argua-
bly insufficient settlement proposal or mediated resolution?
D. Appreciating - and Being Wary of - the Implicit Assumptions Made by
ADR Proponents
This brings to the fore another concern that is arguably under-treated in
Subrin's article, and in much of the ADR literature generally. Much of the
discussion about ADR proceeds on the unspoken assumption that all partici-
pants in the process:
(a) have equally legitimate positions in the dispute;
(b) have equivalent levels of risk tolerance;
(c) proceed in good faith;
(d) genuinely wish to resolve the dispute through an ADR procedure.
All of these implicit assumptions are false. There are often two legitimate
sides to a dispute, with each side having roughly equivalent legitimacy. In
many cases, however, one side is legally "right" and the other is "wrong".
Under these circumstances, a philosophy and infrastructure of ADR that
emphasizes resolution may tend to systematically short-change the party with
the stronger, more legitimate case.
Similarly, many cases may match disputants with roughly equivalent risk
tolerances. However, many other disputes involve a mismatch of risk tolerance
and risk aversion. In such cases, the operational infrastructure of ADR will
tend to disadvantage the risk averse while tending to benefit the risk-preferring
disputant. The risk averse disputant now has an easier path to bailing out. The
risk acceptant disputant can take advantage of this by driving a hard bargain in
ADR or only participating cosmetically in the ADR procedures. After all, the
risk-preferring disputant is just as happy to roll the dice through adjudication
unless it can get a really good deal in ADR.
1. Beware the ADR Abuser
Related to this is the problem of differential levels of good faith in ADR.
While many, perhaps most, disputants participate in good faith; there are a non-
trivial number who do not. They will use ADR not to sincerely attempt resolu-
tion of the dispute but to lengthen the process, increase the opponent's expense,
gather information that might not otherwise be available, and use the ADR
event not for a dose of neutral reality but as a quasi-focus group upon which it
may test drive its various legal and factual arguments for a later trial.
One common complaint about, and suspicion of, court-annexed arbitration
is that some litigants with repeat business and deep pockets misuse this addi-
tional procedural step for the bad faith purposes noted in the preceding para-
graph. Many states, including Nevada, have specific court rules designed to
deter such behavior.2 9 Unfortunately, many states (including Nevada) have
one will ever categorize Lawrence as a feminist hero, his traditional and perhaps stereotyped
observation may not be all that different from that of feminists like Gilligan. Sometimes
there is more power in quiet strength than in bellicose advocacy.
29 See, e.g., Nv. ARB. R. 22(A) (2002) (requiring parties to participate in court-connected
arbitration in good faith).
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been toothless in their interpretation of these rules or statutes, effectively
allowing bad faith behavior in court-annexed arbitration unless the offender
virtually confesses to having ill motives.3"
These problems of ADR, particularly court-imposed arbitration and medi-
ation, are perhaps inevitable when some litigants simply would prefer to fight
rather than settle - or at least prefer to settle as late as possible. For this class
of disputants, ADR is not the early resolution, cost-saving panacea of its propo-
nents. It is instead another ladder on the ever-longer litigation, arbigation, or
medigation trail.
Disinterest in vigorous effort at ADR and earlier settlement may stem
from some legitimate factors. A disputant may genuinely think it owes nothing
and thus cannot bring itself to make even a modest settlement overture. Or the
disputant may legitimately feel it needs to make a point, demonstrating that it is
not easily shaken down for payment. Alternatively, it may see the dispute as
one demanding adjudication in order to establish precedent or to test an issue
that will surely arise repeatedly in other cases if only informally resolved.
But disinterest in ADR may also be the product of a simple strategy of
profiting from delay. If a "medigation" or "arbigation" system permits its ADR
infrastructure to be used in such a manner, ADR would appear to be counter-
productive and abused. Even if medigation or arbigation works for the bulk of
disputes, the judicial system probably needs to take greater steps to ensure that
it is not an unwitting tool of delay and bad faith activity under the guise of
ADR.
This is, of course, not a brief against court-imposed or court-connected
ADR in general. Even without any institutionalized ADR, courts have long
been plagued by the bad faith litigant whose bad faith is perhaps usually unde-
tected if sufficiently subtle. When assessing the degree to which ADR proce-
dures may be misused by "bad" disputants, policymakers cannot forget that
traditional courts are also vulnerable to such misuse, particularly for a party
whose strategy is delay.
Where ADR devices are not court-imposed or court-connected and are
truly voluntary, improper behavior by disputants should be less of a problem in
that the adversary system can serve as a more effective check where the "good"
disputant can simply walk away from wasteful or counterproductive ADR with
a "bad" disputant. But where the ADR is required by court, a party victimized
by bad faith participation has little realistic opinion but to grit its figurative
teeth, finish the meaningless ADR (preferably without giving away any secrets
or tactics that could prove useful in an ultimate trial or other forum), and move
on to the next procedural step in the case. Disputants may be required to com-
plete the process even after it becomes apparent that the other disputant is not
participating in good faith.
This problem admits of no easy answer. Few entities would be willing to
enter into an ADR agreement that makes it too easy to exit the process.
Undoubtedly, some of the very bad faith disputants that are the target of such
30 See, e.g., Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Nev. 2000) (Nevada Supreme
Court reverses trial court finding of failure to arbitrate in good faith despite trial court fact
findings listing several areas in which automobile insurer's arbitration activity - or non-
activity - strongly suggests that participation in arbitration was not meaningful).
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an opt-out clause would use the situation to their advantage by quitting ADR in
mid-stream if it appeared they were losing ground in the process. Conse-
quently, the best but clearly imperfect solution would appear to be putting more
teeth into provisions designed to deter bad faith conduct in ADR and enforce-
ment. This is no easy matter. A half-century ago, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr
alerted us to the oft-forgotten simple truth that there are bad people in the world
who will try to take unfair, even murderous, advantage of good people.3 In a
Twenty-First Century that appears to have more than a few bad actors (ranging
from the murderous Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden types to the nonvi-
olent but extremely costly Dennis Kozlowski, Bernard Ebbers, and Andrew
Fastow), Neibuhr's axiom remains worth remembering.
2. The Problem of Trust and Abuse in ADR
Against this realistic backdrop, courts, policymakers, and commentators
should also remember the lessons of the prisoner's dilemma and other coopera-
tion/competition game theory. The prisoner's dilemma, as known to most post-
1980 law school graduates (and perhaps even viewers of "A Beautiful
Mind"),32 posits the case of two criminal suspects arrested and placed in isola-
tion. The interrogating officer seeks a confession from at least one of the sus-
pects and offers an incentive to get it. The first suspect to cooperate will
receive a dramatically lower sentence. The game theory hypothetical also
assumes that the police need a confession or similarly helpful information from
one of the suspects in order to make the case. If both suspects remain mum,
there will not be enough evidence to convict and maybe not even enough to
bring charges.33
Consequently, it is in the prisoners' collective best interests not to cooper-
ate. However, the separated prisoners are unable to adopt this united front of
defense unless they have great trust in one another. As a result, the likely
outcome of the prisoner's dilemma is that one prisoner cracks and cooperates to
make the best deal for himself at the expense of his co-suspect. The inability of
the participants to fully trust one another and work cooperatively has been
costly for both of them. Although this may be great for law enforcement on the
31 See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS
(1944).
32 "A Beautiful Mind," for benefit of this historical record should this issue of the Law
Journal ever make it into a time capsule, was a motion picture based on a book about John
Forbes Nash, a renowned mathematician and game theorist, and his difficulties with mental
illness as well as his brilliance. See SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF
JOHN FORBES NASH, JR., WINNER OF THE NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS (1994). The movie
and its director, Ron Howard, each won the Academy Award in 2002. Although, Nash is
perhaps best known for the "Nash Equilibrium," he did considerable work in several aspects
of game theory, which was reflected in the book and film. See, e.g., John Nash, Two-Person
Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953); John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining
Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
33 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). Of course, if the evi-
dentiary situation is reasonably close, the prosecutor may press charges despite advice to the
contrary in the hope that continuing legal pressure will prompt one of the conspirators to
"crack" and provide the evidence necessary to make the case. Assuming the charges are not
frivolous in the absence of cooperation from a suspect, this would presumably not be
prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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street and makes for good drama on TV crime shows, it also illustrates the
degree to which potential gains in dispute resolution can be lost through non-
cooperation. Similarly, a party who cooperates and discloses freely to one of
Reinhold Niebuhr's "children of darkness"34 is likely to be taken advantage of
by the less dependable disputant. As a result, ADR efforts are susceptible of
partial or complete failure, just as adjudication results may be incorrect.
Or, perhaps I should say that negotiation efforts are vulnerable on this
basis. The presence of a third party neutral ADR figure (e.g., a mediator or
early neutral evaluator) can reduce these tensions and facilitate trust and coop-
eration and can thus "add value" through ADR just as she may add value by
providing the perspective that will enable the disputants to recognize the ways
in which their own settlement goals may be out of touch with reality.3 5
Mediation and ADR thus have an answer to the prisoner's dilemma issues
and the tension between cooperation and confrontation in dispute resolution.
This though, is only a partial answer. The dilemma remains real and will sys-
tematically impede ADR efforts. Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect mira-
cles in dispute resolution against this almost iron law of cognitive theory.
Proponents of ADR should not forget this as well. Sometimes, the "gation"
segment of mediation will be necessary to continue moving dispute resolution
toward successful conclusion.
Perhaps what I am suggesting in overly long fashion is that the "new,"
ADR-friendly Steve Subrin, despite the nuanced care of his paper, tacitly sup-
ports the longstanding critique of ADR, most widely associated with sociolo-
gist Laura Nader, that the thrust of modem ADR focuses too much on
achieving short-term peace and harmony and may thereby undermine justice
concerns and the long-term health and harmony of society by artificially sup-
pressing or deferring social conflict. At least this is my concern. Since this
also applies to judicial signaling (the Brunet article) and to Jean Sternlight's
commentary regarding the fit of ADR, I defer additional discussion of the
"Nader critique" until the conclusion of this comment.
II. BRUNET'S NEW TRADITIONALISM: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
(JUDICIOUSLY) RAISED JUDICIAL EYEBROW
Professor Edward Brunet has historically been less identified as a tradi-
tionalist than Professor Subrin. Although Brunet has written eloquently on the
limits and potential pitfalls of arbitration,36 he has been something short of a
defender of the litigation status quo. His writings reflect sympathy for efforts
to streamline litigation and an acceptance of the inevitability of judicial discre-
tion as perhaps the leading tool for fighting adjudication gridlock.3 7 Conse-
3 See NIEBUHR, supra note 31.
3 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L.
REv. 323, 324-25 (1994).
36 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81
(1992); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1 (1987).
37 See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LIT. 273 (1991). See also Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment
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quently, it is perhaps not surprising that he endorses a judge's use of such
discretion in his article in this Symposium.
38
In essence, Brunet looks at perhaps the most common traditional settle-
ment practice of judges - feedback suggesting the judge's view of the relative
strength of the parties' positions - and finds it can play a legitimate role in
modern dispute resolution. 39 Brunet's defense of judicial signaling comes as
perhaps a bit of a surprise, however, considering the general tenor of recent
commentary about the problems when judges become settlers. Considerable
recent efforts of both the bar and the academy have argued for greater imparti-
ality of both judges and others presiding over dispute resolution."n Brunet's
position on judicial signaling arguably cuts against the grain to a degree by
arguing that judicial ethics properly applied do not stand in the way of the
judge signaling his or her position.
A. Criteria for Fairness in Judicial Signaling
Although I consider myself something of a "hawk" on judicial ethics who,
on the whole, would rather see more rather than fewer recusals, 4 1 I also find
myself largely in agreement with Brunet's position. If judicial signaling is con-
strained and not excessive, it should not run afoul of the impartiality expecta-
tions we place upon judges. I am implicitly including in my list of necessary
conditions for proper judicial signaling the following:
* The judge's knowledge of the case and conclusions about the case must
be judicially acquired during the course of regular and legitimate judi-
cial activity. The judge may not have come to the views expressed to
counsel or hinted at on the basis of extra-judicial sources;
" The judge's impressions of the case cannot, in significant part42 , be the
result of any ex parte proceeding;
Materials, 147 F.R.D. 647, 679 (1993); Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert
Testimony in Summary Judgment, 22 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 93, 138 (1988).
38 See Brunet, supra note 15, at 256.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 944-49 (2000) (noting judicial push toward facilitat-
ing settlement and away from procedural process and adjudication since 1950s); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 153 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answer for the Adversary Concept of Lawyers' Responsibility, 38 TEX. L. REV.
407, 421 (1997). Jean Sternlight has similar concerns about judicial signaling. See Ster-
nlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflection on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV.
L.J. 289, 303 n.69 (2003).
41 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 632-
43 (1988) (arguing that many of the accepted practices of judges in hearing cases in fact call
into reasonable question the court's impartiality, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455, general
federal statute governing judicial disqualification).
42 The discerning reader undoubtedly will ask whether there can be "insignificant" impact
on the judge from ex parte activity. I think the answer is yes. For example, counsel for one
of the parties may apply for a temporary restraining order (see FED. R. Civ. P. 65) and even
get it through an ex parte application process in which counsel understandably will spin the
facts as favorably as possible (including the facts that justify the ex pane approach to the
court). However, ethical counsel should not misrepresent facts to the court nor engage in
extended argumentation based on facts that will be contested at any proceeding in the matter.
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" Any expression of judicial reaction to aspects of a case should both
appear non-final and in fact be non-final. It is permissible for the court
to make tentative conclusions based on judicially acquired information,
but the court's conclusions should not become fixed except as author-
ized by the Civil Rules;
4 3
" The judicial signaling is non-coercive in that the judge provides infor-
mation but does not threaten adverse consequences if a party does not
take the judicial hint that a case is weak or a demand too large. The
judge signals but does not strong-arm;
• Corollary to this is the proviso that the judge does not retaliate (at least
not consciously) against a party that fails to understand a judicial hint or
act as the court had hoped in response to judicial signaling.
* The judicially signaling court has ruled evenhandedly and accurately
during the process of acquiring the knowledge upon which the judicial
signaling is premised. For example, judicial signaling would be worth-
less or counterproductive if, on the road to the court's signal, the judge
had systematically denied one party necessary discovery. Even if such
errors are not intentional, they make signaling suspect. Consequently,
judges should be highly confident that their pre-signal rulings and
administration of the proceeding have been largely correct before engag-
ing in signaling; and
" Judicial signaling and settlement offers do not include bullying by the
judge, or even anything that can be construed as bullying or anger.44
Under these conditions, the court can accept the ex parte argument that the status quo should
be preserved through a TRO but not have been improperly led to any hasty conclusions
about the ultimate merits of the case. A TRO application, ex parte or contested, does not
engage in fact finding or make legal determinations on the merits as does a preliminary
injunction decision which, by definition, occurs after a hearing.
Where, however, the judge forms opinions based significantly on the ex parte represen-
tations of one side, the judge should not use this information as a basis for tentative determi-
nation of the merits of the case in a way that is communicated to counsel except for perhaps
this exception. As Professor Brunet points out, judicial signaling can be used to alert a party
of a need to provide additional information to the court. If a judge hears something during
an ex parte contact that may prejudice the judge against the other party (or unduly bias the
judge toward the moving party), it may be perfectly proper for the court to bring this mate-
rial to the surface so that it may be rebutted by the party that was absent from the ex parte
proceeding.
43 This, of course, does not mean the court must allow every dispute to come to full-dress
trial. For example, in deciding a summary judgment motion, it would be perfectly proper for
the court to come to a final conclusion that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact so
long as the court observed proper procedure in deciding the summary judgment motion and
the record supported the court's conclusion. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56; JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, IT 56.01-.50 (1997 & Supp. 2002).
4 I realize this point is repetitive to a degree of a prior point, but I believe there is a
difference between substantive coercion (e.g., a suggestion that failure to settle will likely be
followed by a partial summary judgment ruling against the non-settling party) and judicial
intemperance that may stampede a party into undesired settlement. An example will perhaps
illustrate what may be a distinction that exists only in my mind.
I once was involved on the periphery of a pretrial conference that involved a claim for
insurance benefits of $150,000 under a homeowner's policy for a house destroyed by fire.
The insurer was essentially asserting arson as the cause of the fire and refusing to pay. It had
a pretty good case. The fire was suspicious in origin. The policyholder had recently run up
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Of course, before wringing our collective hands over the situation too
much, we should also remember that American litigation is an adversary sys-
tem that requires a certain amount of intestinal fortitude by counsel. My judge
discussed in footnote forty-four did nothing tangible against the lawyer with the
list of forty-five witnesses. No one forced the lawyer to go from zero to
$75,000 regarding settlement in less than a minute. Nonetheless, despite our
warrior-like expectations of litigators, my own view is that judges must be
exceedingly temperate lest their outbursts erroneously be regarded as commen-
tary on the merits or hostility toward counsel. Had insurer counsel survived the
outburst (which was very rare for this judge, who was known to be extremely
kind to counsel), I am confident that the case would have been tried with no
prejudice toward counsel or the insurer. But settling counsel apparently did not
share that confidence.
What Brunet describes has been going on for a long time. It predates both
the original ADR movement (commercial arbitration in the early Twentieth
Century) and the "new" ADR of the past thirty years and continues to survive
and thrive. This indicates to me the continued value of the tool.
six figures in gaming debts. The policyholders were conveniently "away" at the time of the
fire. The deposition testimony of the policyholders (husband and wife) was inconsistent and
suspicious.
Faced with these facts, the policyholder's counsel took a most interesting tack at the
conference before the judge. He pointedly asked how he was to prepare for trial when the
insurer had designated some forty-five or fifty witnesses in its portion of the final pretrial
order. For anything other than large, complex litigation, forty-five witnesses is, of course, a
lot of witnesses. Certainly, this was the judge's view. He, to be charitable, went ballistic
when his attention was drawn to the witness list.
Insurer counsel attempted to explain that the list was long simply to preserve his options
since many of the witnesses were fungible and that the trial would only last a week, but it
was to no avail. The damage had been done. The judge was fuming over the long list of
witnesses and also managed to wonder why the case had not settled. Obligingly, insurer
counsel plopped $75,000 on the table (hedging a bit about needing to clear this with the
client), which was eagerly grabbed by policyholder counsel. The case ultimately did settle, I
believe for that amount.
I have often wondered how the insurer reacted to this resolution of the case. I presume
insurer counsel had authority for something like the $75,000 figure but I also presume that it
was the outer limit of authority, to be used during trial if things were going badly. Yes, I
know that juries are disinclined to label an average citizen an arsonist, but still the case
reeked of arson. I have, on occasion, been accused of being pro-policyholder about insur-
ance coverage questions. See William P. Shelley & Richard C. Mason, Application of the
Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction
or Deconstruction?, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 749, 772 n.108 (1998) (making this criticism of
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY
FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 155 n.4 (1994) (See also my rebuttal in Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing The "Absolute" Exclusion in Context
and In Accord with its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 57 n.219
(1998)). But if I were a juror, I would have backed the insurer on this one.
Did the judge improperly coerce settlement? I really don't think so. Did the judge
improperly suggest hostility toward one side's lawyer? Yes, and this in my view warped the
resolution of the case.
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B. Classifying Signaling: Judging or Mediation?
But is "judicial signaling" really a form of mediation or is it simply an
aspect of judging? I think the latter.4 5 There are, of course, other views and
considerable debate over the classification of mediator styles and their permis-
sibility.46 Although we generally associate judging with formal rulings on
motions, the judicial task regularly and appropriately encompasses a wide
range of activity: pretrial conferences; rulings on non-dispositive motions such
as discovery disputes and pleading issues, even when the controversy between
the parties may be trivial; jury selection; evidence rulings; jury instruction; trial
and pretrial administration; in-camera review to evaluate claims of privilege.
45 On the issue of mediation generally, I have a marginal or nitpicking difference with Bru-
net in that he appears to divide the mediation world according to two axes: (1) judicial-
private; (2) evaluative-transformative. I have two qualms about these dichotomies.
First, as discussed more extensively in text, I do not regard judicial signaling as real
"mediation." Some of the shuttle diplomacy and creative settlement efforts done by judges
may constitute mediation, but it is considerably more truncated than mediation by others.
Consequently, I am hesitant to label this type of judicial activity as mediation. It is settle-
ment effort and it is a form of ADR, but calling it mediation can be misleading. In making
this observation, I am ironically making an assessment similar to that of traditional media-
tion "facilitists," who have criticized the presence of legal assessment in mediation (and my
writings in support of such "evaluation"). These commentators admit that evaluation occurs
and may even admit its unavoidability, but strongly argue that any process with an evalua-
tive aspect should not be deemed "mediation." See, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons
Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997); Kimberlee K.
Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 31 (1996).
Second, "transformative" mediation remains a relatively small subset of the mediation
conducted in the world. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOG-
NITION (1994). The larger, although in my view overly crude or even false, dichotomy dis-
cussed by most commentators is over "evaluative" mediation and "facilitative" mediation.
My own preferred lexicon suggests that most mediation is largely facilitative with significant
elements of evaluation or reference to the applicable legal framework. I prefer to refer to
this modal mediation as "eclectic." See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic:
Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247; Richard Birke, Evaluation and
Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 309; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identi-
fying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation
in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 371; Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation:
How - and Why - Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DisP.
RESOL. 41; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for
Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949
(1997).
46 See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for The Perplexed, I HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996) (arguably the article
that initiated and framed the inquiry and debate); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and
Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991)
(an important article of empirical research reflecting variance in mediator styles and the
presence of significant evaluative reference to the law during many mediations); Lela P.
Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One
Eclectic Process, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 295 (appreciating reference to the law and presence
of evaluation in ADR generally but arguing that mediation is and should be as primarily,
even purely, facilitative); Joseph P. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediation Ori-
entations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985 (1997).
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In short, judging can mean a lot of things. Can it mean communicating a
judge's thoughts and preliminary evaluations on aspects of the case to counsel?
If so, what are the purposes?
As Brunet points out, a common use of judicial signaling is to guide coun-
sel as to the adequacy of submissions to date. Similarly, the court may signal -
or even specifically request - additional briefing or discovery. This is not an
improper judicial expression on matter reserved for the jury. It is a form of
judging with considerable value. It not only provides rulings and moves the
case along but also helps counsel understand the issues in the case that need
further development if the court is to accept counsel's contentions. Negative
signaling tells the lawyer that the message is not getting through. Lawyers can
improve or repackage the presentation to achieve better presentation and
persuasion.4 7
Seen in this light, judicial signaling of the type discussed by Brunet is no
more inappropriate than a court's memorandum explaining its basis for a rul-
ing. For example, if a judge rejects a motion to dismiss or a motion for sum-
mary judgment and explains why, this gives counsel a roadmap for possible
rehabilitation of its position. The court may even rule again on essentially the
same issues through the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a second (or
even third) motion on the topic (multiple motions on the same issue are
frowned upon by the court but may be permitted if based on different legal
grounds or emerging factual information). Informal judicial signaling may be
distinguished, but it may be a distinction without a difference.
On the whole, informal judicial signaling seems closer to judging than to
mediation, which is part of the problem if one is concerned about possible
judicial bias or lack of procedural process. Although I have argued that media-
tion is eclectic and frequently contains evaluative elements and reference to the
law, it is unquestioned that mediation is substantially a facilitative process that
involves the mediator drawing out the goals, needs, and concerns of the dispu-
tants in order to attempt to assist the disputants in resolving the matter.
Mediators attempt to add value not only through the "reality check" of evalua-
47 I can attest to the value of such arguably negative feedback. I once was part of a litiga-
tion team representing a manufacturing plant that had been sold a defective biomass boiler.
Instead of crisply consuming the biomass product and producing energy from the plant, the
boiler chronically was fouled (even if a boiler is well-designed, biomass fuel presents more
challenges than cleaner burning fuels such as natural gas), forcing shutdowns of the boiler
and the plant. The plant's claims against the boilermaker were brought in arbitration.
On the first day of the arbitration, it became clear that the arbitrators were having
trouble visualizing and understanding the mechanical problems afflicting the boiler and the
plant. Fortunately, the case was large enough to support a multi-lawyer team. While part of
the team continued to present evidence, another lawyer and I flew to the afflicted plant and
made a "day in the life video" of the plant, which showed quite graphically the nature and
scope of the problem. We returned to the arbitration, showed the video, and appeared to
receive a heightened level of understanding from the arbitrators. The final arbitration was
quite favorable to the claimant, suggesting that the arbitrators indeed understood the serious-
ness of the problem. Would this have been clear without the visual aid? I am skeptical.
Should I, or one of the other lawyers, have thought of the video before the hearing? Yes, of
course. But we didn't, which made the arbitrator feedback and flexibility of the process
extremely valuable. Although this example stems from a formal hearing, it could have easily
emerged from a pretrial conference in a case that was litigated rather than arbitrated.
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tive feedback but also through enabling the parties to articulate alternative
means of achieving their goals. Mediators also attempt to expand the universe
of possible solutions, as well as to assess a zone of possible agreement and
attempt to relocate disputants into that zone.
All of this takes considerable time and expertise. Almost all mediations of
which I am aware consume a minimum of half a day. More commonly, any-
thing but the simplest matter requires a full day of mediation. Although the
process need not be an exercise in protracted navel gazing, neither can it be
rushed if a successful settlement is to be achieved.
Contrast this to a typical judge's settlement conference. The standard
issue here is one-half hour. For the occasion of larger cases, a judge or magis-
trate may be involved in ninety minutes or two hours of settlement brokerage.
Seldom, if ever, does a judicial officer begin to approach the time investment of
the average private mediator for a similar matter.
This time disparity alone suggests that what judges do is not mediation
even if it is seeking settlement. Rather, judicial signaling looks more like
informal, tentative judging that acts almost in the nature of a significant non-
dispositive ruling that does not control the case but has clear implications upon
which counsel may act. A range of responses to the judicial signal is possible.
At one end of the continuum, counsel is free to respond with renewed or
increased litigation efforts. Near the other end of the spectrum, counsel can
settle quickly based substantially on the handwriting the court has placed
(albeit in pencil) on the wall.
A brief examination of negotiation theory and technique, like mediation
theory and technique, also strongly suggests that judicial signaling is better
classified as a part of the judicial process and not a separate ADR technique.
The modern tenets of negotiation are well set forth in the classic work Getting
to Yes, first published in 1981,48 and continue to be refined in excellent recent
explorations of the topic.4 9 Axioms of effective negotiation include to "sepa-
rate the people from the problem," to avoid "bargaining over positions," "to use
principled negotiations with objective standards."5 °
To perhaps state the obvious, all of this takes time and a depth of under-
standing of the underlying dispute that ordinarily is not readily possessed by the
court. Courts see the metaphorical tip of the iceberg in a dispute. Even as
discovery, briefing, motion practice, and trial may educate the court as to the
legal aspects of the dispute, comparatively little time and resources are invested
in educating the court as to the extra-legal or sub-legal factors that bear on a
negotiated resolution of the matter (whether achieved bilaterally through the
parties alone or with the assistance of a mediator). Under these circumstances,
it becomes even more difficult to characterize even activist judicial signaling as
more mediation/ADR rather than a branch of judging.
48 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTI'NG TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
oUr GIVING IN (3d ed. 1997).
49 See, e.g., RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY (2002); ROBERT
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING To CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIS-
surEs (2000).
'0 FISHER & URY, supra note 48, at 13.
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C. Appreciating the Potential Pitfalls of Judicial Signaling
Brunet correctly notes that excessive judicial zeal in signaling can lead
judges to cross over the ethical line into unfair prejudgment of a matter. 5 1
Although I concur with Brunet that this danger can be minimized and that judi-
cial signaling should not be barred or unduly limited, it may be that his article
nonetheless understates the potential dangers of the practice.
By potential dangers, I mean not simply the risk that specific, isolated
parties will be bludgeoned into settlement, but also the risk that the develop-
ment of the law will be slowed, skewed, or warped by judicial signaling that
discourages complete adjudication in cases where this may be necessary for
establishing legal precedent and public policy.
In other words, one should not underplay the dangers of the snap decision
or the flight to the status quo by a judge who is (completely innocently)
attempting to signal skepticism about a case in hopes of seeing a (relatively
modest) settlement rather than face the burden of writing a long opinion
explaining why the court is rejecting a novel theory of liability or other legal
argument.
For example, for nearly twenty years after passage of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, comparatively few people appeared to think that sexual har-
assment of a female employee was a violation of the Act so long as the sexual
harassment was not central to an adverse hiring or firing decision. In essence,
there was not solid legal or social acceptance of the now-established concept
that a woman worker could be constructively discharged or materially
adversely affected in her job because co-workers or boss were making unsuc-
cessful passes at her, however ham-handed and unsuccessful, or generally
harassing her.
As we now know through hindsight, Katherine MacKinnon, then an attor-
ney, and others did not share this view and set out to establish sexual harass-
ment as gender discrimination, illegal under Title VII. MacKinnon's book,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women, published in 1979,52 was a significant
early salvo in the battle and was accompanied or followed by test litigation. In
a relatively short time-span (for law), she and others were successful in estab-
lishing sexual harassment as forbidden conduct in violation of Title VII.5 3 The
issues surrounding the law of sexual harassment remain, of course, open to a
degree, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's continued visitation of the issue
in the years since Meritor Savings Bank was decided.5 4
A minute's indulgence in thought experiment demonstrates that excessive
judicial signaling has quite a capacity to chill the sort of development of the
law reflected in the recognition of a right of action for sexual harassment. Prior
to Meritor, a signaling judge might easily persuade a plaintiff and employer to
51 See Brunet, supra note 15, at 256.
52 See CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon subsequently entered academia and is a now the
Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
53 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
51 See, e.g., Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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settle such matters relatively inexpensively in order to avoid their twin respec-
tive fears of a defense judgment and bad publicity. Undoubtedly, such signal-
ing probably did occur during the pre-Meritor days of sexual harassment
claims and probably did, on occasion, have the effect of fostering settlements
that may well have hindered the development of the law.
Illustrations like this serve to remind that judicial signaling can become
close-minded rejection of necessary law reform, law extension, or the recalibra-
tion of the technical fine points of the law. Brunet does not endorse this sort of
"erroneous" or "wrongful" judicial signaling. However, we must remember
that it lurks in the shadows almost every time a judge gives informal feedback
to the parties or counsel. Unlike errors made on the record or as part of a
formal ruling, these settlement-creating errors are not subject to appeal.
To some extent, this concern about judicial signaling reprises the long-
running debate on the limits of appropriate judicial management of cases. Crit-
ics of managerial judging, such as Judith Resnik, have convincingly argued that
too much straying from the traditional adjudicative role is fraught with dan-
ger.55 Although judicial management seems not to have been greatly curtailed
as a result of these criticisms, it is likely that such managerial efforts have at
least been more restrained because of the dialogue. At a minimum, the con-
cems raised by the critics of managerial judging should serve as caution to the
profession to refrain from embracing too aggressive a version of judicial
signaling.
Like managerial judging and the hydraulic pressure for settlement and
peace over full adjudication, judicial signaling can truncate the growth and
development of law by permitting courts to cling too tightly to conventional
wisdom. In addition, these court activities come against a backdrop of civil
disputing developments that tend to discourage a full airing of legal and factual
arguments:
" FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (which discourages innovative claims to a degree
even if it has been substantially defanged in the 1993 Amendments to
the Civil Rules);5 6
• The Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire trilogy of Supreme Court evidence
holdings making admissibility of expert testimony more difficult, a
development that generally falls more heavily on the party with the bur-
den of persuasion (e.g., plaintiffs);57 and
* Modern Summary Judgment practice derived from the Supreme Court's
1986 trilogy of cases, which makes attainment of summary judgment
easier than was traditionally the case, another development generally
favoring the party without the burden of persuasion (e.g., defendants).5 8
5 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982).
56 See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVEN-
TIVE MEASURES (2d ed. 1992).
57 See Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of
the Supreme Court's Trilogy of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001).
58 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror. The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Sum-
mary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988).
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Brunet in particular should appreciate this concern. His treatise on sum-
mary judgment notes the greater availability of summary judgment and its
extensive potential for ending cases.5 9 In this Symposium's article, Brunet is
now quite bullish on judicial signaling as well as summary judgment. This is
consistent but arguably dangerous in the hands of a judge who is too eager to
foster non-adjudicative resolution of a matter. Judicial signaling may be seen
as a threat of dismissal or summary judgment if the disfavored party does not
cooperate in settling the matter.
Judicial signaling therefore holds the danger of becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The judge signals a litigant with the temerity to resist, who then
suffers summary judgment (e.g., "Ms. MacKinnon, I can't believe you won't
accept defendant's offer of a nuisance value settlement to get rid of this sexual
harassment suit. But no matter, I find that no reasonable jury could side with
you, so I'm entering Summary Judgment for the defense on the ground that
Title VII as a matter of law does not create a claim for relief based on sexual
harassment.").
In the universe of tools designed to thin court dockets, I prefer judicial
signaling, even aggressive judicial signaling, to more stretched use of summary
judgment, Rule 11, or evidence barriers. But the attractions and dangers of all
these devices are not all that disparate. Nonetheless, if decoupled from other
case management or pretrial disposition devices and stripped of a judge's per-
sonal prejudices, judicial signaling can play the positive role envisioned by
Brunet.
III. CARRINGTON'S VICTORIAN SHOCK ABOUT THE SUPREME COURT'S
CHEAP AND SHALLOW AFFAIR WITH ARBITRATION - AND
ENFORCED PRIVATE ORDERING
In his contribution to the Symposium, Paul Carrington sounds the horn of
alarm regarding the judiciary's excessive zeal - its "judicial activism" if you
will - in promoting arbitration and privatization generally. With considerable
force, Carrington accuses the United States Supreme Court of having moved
toward reduction - even abdication - of the judicial role. According to Car-
rington, the Court, in its zeal to support privatization of dispute resolution, has
distorted the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act and been excessively cred-
ulous of the claimed virtues of arbitration and ADR.6 °
A. Carrington's Map of the Road to Arbitration Perdition
I find Carrington's critique largely persuasive, perhaps because it echoes
my own long-held view that the Court has been almost embarrassingly simplis-
tic and partisan in its cheerleading for arbitration and ADR generally.61 In a
59 See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2d ed. 2000).
60 See Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court,
3 NEV. L.J. 259 (2003).
61 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION-
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward
Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996)
[hereinafter Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah]; Jeffrey W. Stempel,
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line of cases stretching over the past forty years, the Court has moved from its
historical distrust of and resistance to arbitration agreements,62 to increased
solicitude for labor arbitration,63 encouragement of commercial arbitration,6 4
federalization of the law of arbitrability, 65 and elimination of most statutory
restrictions on arbitrability. 66 These decisions and other post-1990 holdings of
the lower federal courts were in considerable contrast to prior Supreme Court
decisions that predated Moses H. Cone and Southland v. Keating which had
found statutorily-based exceptions to arbitrability.6 7
Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 259.
62 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that disputes arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 are not arbitrable notwithstanding clear party agreement to arbitrate
such disputes). The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted, in large part, at the behest of
commercial interests who had become frustrated with the judiciary's historical resistance to
the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better
Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380-83 (1991) [hereinafter Stempel, A
Better Approach to Arbitrability]. See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet
v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 232 F. 403 (1916) (Learned Hand, then a district judge, ref-
uses to enforce an extremely clear arbitration agreement in a commercial contract, finding
that such agreements impermissibly oust courts of jurisdiction.). This resistance persisted, to
a degree, in both the Supreme Court, as evidenced by Wilko v. Swan, and in lower courts.
See, e.g., N. & D. Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1976) (court
gives language of arbitration clause extremely narrow reading to avoid committing particular
contract dispute to arbitration).
63 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In this "Steelworkers Trilogy," the Court took an
expansive approach to the arbitrability of labor disputes and endorsed arbitration as a
favored means of achieving industrial peace. These cases were, however, technically not
Federal Arbitration Act cases but were decided under Section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, which has historically governed labor arbitration. Nonetheless, the Steel-
workers Trilogy appears in retrospect to have been the beginning of the Supreme Court's
movement from resistance to embrace regarding arbitration.
I See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See also The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforcing forum selection clause in
towing contract that functioned as equivalent of ADR or arbitration clause).
65 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). As discussed below, Professor Carrington
sees Southland v. Keating as the key case in shaping the Court's modem arbitration doctrine.
Others may take issue. For example, Professor Stemlight views Moses H. Cone as the key
case setting the Court on its current path. See Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 660 (1996)
66 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that workers
may be bound by arbitration clauses that are a condition to attaining a job, despite seemingly
contrary language of Section 1 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (implicitly finding that there was no Age Discrimi-
nation Act to arbitrability); Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) and holding that claims arising
under the Securities Act of 1933 may be arbitrated); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987) (holding that claims made pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable).
67 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (civil rights
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 may not be arbitrated); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight
Sys., Inc. 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act claims not subject to arbitration);
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Although there have been some anomalous decisions during this time
period,68 Carrington's characterization is correct. Most of the past forty years
of Supreme Court ADR jurisprudence has been an extolling of the virtues of
arbitration and a steady march toward privatization. Unlike many of the other
important, law-shifting decisions of the late Twentieth Century Court, the arbi-
tration rulings were largely not 5-4 imbroglios in which a particular voting
coalition (usually the conservative wing of the Court) triumphed over Justices
more supportive of government, remedial legislation, consumers, and legal lia-
bility.69 LBJ confidant Abe Fortas wrote an important early opinion in the
trend7 ° while liberal paragon Justice Brennan authored another key opinion. 7'
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII claims not subject to
arbitration).
Also see, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (enforcing arbi-
tration clause in form lending agreement); Doctor's Ass'n., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996) (enforcing arbitration clause in franchise agreement that was highly favorable to
franchiser despite state statute setting conditions on arbitration agreements by requiring clear
presentation of the clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995) (enforcing arbitration clause in pest eradication service contract marketed to home-
owners); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (Carriage of
Goods at Sea Act does not limit application of arbitration clause). One prominent arbitration
authority characterized these cases as "characteristically supportive of arbitration" and con-
cluded that by the mid-1990s, the "wall of judicial policy that protects arbitration is solid and
looms large, and appears increasingly impossible to scale." See Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice Through the Contract of Arbitra-
tion, 6 AM. J. INT'L ARB. 1, 2 (1995). See also Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998).
68 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (arguably back-
ing away from the "separability" doctrine of Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Company, 388 U.S. 395 (1967), and requiring judicial examination of reach of arbitration
clause in contract); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995)
(holding that New York law's traditional restriction on award of punitive damages in arbitra-
tion is not incorporated into arbitration and choice of law clauses in securities agreement that
bound individual investors).
69 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(5-4 majority of Court holds that Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule lOb-5 do not create cause of action for aiding and abetting violation of securities
laws; Dissent notes that such actions had largely been recognized by lower courts in the
thirty years prior to Court's decision; Court aligns on largely ideological basis with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in majority with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent).
70 Justice Fortas was the author of Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Com-
pany, 388 U.S. 395 (1967), which held that, in a sale in a contract with an arbitration clause,
questions of fraud in the inducement of the contract should in first instance be decided by the
arbitrator. The Prima Paint approach is arguably inconsistent with the Court's approach to
the division of authority between arbitrators and courts found in First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). The Supreme Court largely continues to follow Prime
Paint, however. See Howsman v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, 123 S. Ct. 588 (2002). See also
Richard C. Reuben, Howsam, First Options, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring
Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, SMU L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (arguing in favor of First Options approach and for abandonment or restriction of
separability approach of Prima Paint).
71 Justice Brennan was the author of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), an important step in the modem pro-arbitration trend and
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Divided as it might be on other issues, the Supreme Court has largely been
unified in its support for arbitration.7 2
B. A Differing View of the Source of Arbitral Error
I generally agree with Carrington's general historical-sociological-political
explanation of the modem judicial trend supporting arbitration to the point of
almost uncritical lionization.7 3 I also generally agree with Carrington that this
is "bad" jurisprudence and public policy. However, my agreement with Car-
rington's excellent, even stem-winding, call to action is limited in the following
ways.
First, I do not believe that the chief error of the Court was in federalizing
the substantive law of arbitration through a rereading of the Act. Rather, the
substantive error was failing to give an appropriate interpretation to Section 1
of the Act, which quite clearly states that arbitration agreements in employment
contracts are not enforceable.74 Thus, in my view, the "worst case" of the
Court's modem era of arbitral infatuation is not Southland v. Keating75 (as
suggested by Carrington's article) but rather Circuit City v. Adams 76 or Gilmer
v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corporation,77 both of which essentially held that
arbitration agreements could be crammed down the throat of an employee.
Although Circuit City v. Adams is, in my view, a wrongly decided case
and the case that directly and concretely (and finally) puts the Court on record
as limiting the reach of Section 1 of the Arbitration Act, one can argue that it is
not nearly as important as the earlier cases in the arbitration trend which,
through the uncritical embrace of arbitration, made it unlikely that the Court
could in 2001 limit arbitrability under Section 1 grounds. In addition, there is a
long history of lower court case law reading the Section 1 exception nar-
rowly.78 In my view, it is horribly erroneous case law79 but it is nonetheless
a building block of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), the case most criticized
by Carrington as excessively pro-arbitration.
72 The exception of sorts to this rule has involved possible statutory restrictions on arbitra-
tion. For example, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), involving the
arbitrability of Title VII and employment claims, reflected a considerably more divided (5-4)
Court, as did Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), in which the
Court (by a 5-4 vote) enforced a standard form arbitration agreement in a consumer contract
even though it did not appraise the consumer that it would share responsibility for paying the
costs of the arbitration.
73 See Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah, supra note 61; Stempel, A
Better Approach to Arbitrability, supra note 62 (arguing that modem pro-arbitration juris-
prudence of the Supreme Court has failed to give adequate examination of and respect for
issues of genuine consent to arbitration).
71 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1
of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991
J. Disp. RESOL. 259.
75 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
76 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
77 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
78 See, e.g., Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 235
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of
Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
79 See Stempel, supra note 74, at 280-302 (arguing that restrictive reading of Section 1 is
inconsistent with prevailing approaches to correct construction of statutes).
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precedent that has been relatively unchallenged for many years. My point is
not so much to identify one "worst" case in forty years of problematic Supreme
Court jurisprudence about arbitrability. Rather, I am arguing that the "villain"
in this drama is not Southland v. Keating and the federalization of American
arbitration law so much as it is the federal common law of arbitrability adopted
by the Court.
Second, I do not think that the modem substantive law favoring arbitration
is the problem nearly so much as the Court's wooden, formalist, excessively
textual, and crude contract interpretation. Many of the arguably unsatisfactory
judicial decisions mandating arbitration would be reversed or acceptably modi-
fied if the Court had evidenced any ability to consider consent issues seriously
and to read arbitration clauses and other contract provisions in context.8"
C. Another Look at the Historical Route of the Court's Modem Arbitration
Doctrine
Carrington also correctly criticizes the Court and Southland for taking a
somewhat ahistorical approach to its important role of judicial interpretation.
For example, the Southland majority opinion does not even mention Bernhardt
v. Polygraph Company,8 a case squarely at odds with - even overruled by -
the Southland holding. One might at least expect a nation's Supreme Court to
be candid and explicit when it was making a dramatic change in the law. Only
Justice O'Connor's Southland dissent notes that modern cases prior to South-
land had regarded the Arbitration Act as only a procedural statute applicable in
federal court rather than as substantive national law applicable in all courts.8 2
For the Southland majority to make this pivot so suddenly and without any
serious discussion of its departure from prior law is a bit bizarre, even disingen-
uous.83 In addition to its many other attributes, Carrington's work is important
in reminding the profession of the potential importance of a single case and the
tendency toward fait accompli in the law. People (and Justices) tend to have
short memories and to accept as legitimate what was or should have been con-
troversial at the time. The winners write history. Once a case is decided, it is
hard to reverse field. The case, even if poorly reasoned and incorrectly
80 See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the
Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 (1995); Jean Braucher,
The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. Rav. 49, 61-69 (1995) (Court's contract jurispru-
dence reads as though justices were consumed by "blinding fog" of free market rhetoric);
Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw.
U. L. Ray. 107, 113 (1995) (traditional contract values lost ground during 1970s to law and
economics-driven values); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 81
CAL. L. Rav. 433, 436 (1993) (Court's contract interpretation decisions of the late Twentieth
Century are part of sweeping, "even radical, pro-market jurisprudence.").
81 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
82 See 465 U.S. at 22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
83 To this extent, Subrin's history and Carrington's critique merge: The Pound Conference
and the ADR movement (both 1960s neighborhood justice center and 1970s business
embrace of ADR) softened up the Supreme Court for a major pro-arbitration agreement. It
was also no accident that Southland was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the driving
force of the Pound Conference and a relatively early cheerleader for arbitration. One need
not be much of a legal realist or a cynic to fault the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for seeming
to place ideology ahead of legal analysis.
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decided, creates a system that will affect the lives of all that follow. For that
reason, the Court owes the public a duty of greater care and candor - and
explanation - than it displayed in Southland v. Keating.
Carrington's work thus also opens a most interesting window on stare
decisis. Southland was seriously questioned within a decade of its rendering
and is now more subject to serious questioning with the critique of Carrington
and his colleague, Paul Haagen.84 But Justice O'Connor, alleged champion of
states' rights, will not revisit the issue.85 Although stare decisis and stability
are generally good things, they should not provide an iron wall around prob-
lematic, poorly reasoned, or result-oriented precedent.
Despite my admiration for Carrington's tour de force critique of the
Court's arbitration jurisprudence, I have some differences with Carrington
regarding the degree of error he posits in Southland v. Keating. Carrington
suggests that the legislative intent underlying the Federal Arbitration Act was
curbing federal court refusal to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements.8 6 I
have reviewed the entire official legislative history of the Act and a good deal
of secondary authority about the Act, much of it contemporary to passage of the
Act. None of these materials suggests that the perceived problem spurring the
Act was confined to federal courts. Rather, American courts as a whole - both
state and federal - appear to have been hostile to arbitration agreements. In
light of this background, it does not seem improper to me that the Act evolved
to be interpreted as creating a federal substantive law of arbitration rather than
a rule of procedure applicable only in federal court.
To be sure, Carrington raises interesting historical points that buttress his
view that the Court had made the right decision in the 1957 Bernhardt deci-
sion87 and should have resisted the "free" market's call for reinterpretation in
the 1984 Southland decision. In 1925, when the Act was considered and
enacted, the American notions of interstate commerce were more restrained.
Hence, the enacting Congress might even have thought it had no power to dic-
tate arbitration law in state courts. The Arbitration Act also predated the Rules
Enabling Act of 193488 and the 1938 promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Perhaps the Congress passing the Arbitration Act simply
could not visualize a federal law that controlled state procedure regarding arbi-
trability at a time when a state's rules of procedure generally dictated procedure
for the federal courts located in that state.
But in making this argument, Carrington is implicitly suggesting that only
statutory text and concrete, specific legislative intent are authoritative guides to
statutory intention. On this point, there is considerable debate. Many, perhaps
most, in the legal profession agree that the more general statutory purpose of a
statute can, under the right circumstances, be as authoritative an interpretative
84 See Paul D. Carrington & Paul Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
331 (1997).
85 See Paul D. Carrington, supra note 60, at 280.
86 Id. at 264-65.
87 See Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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tool as text of legislative history.89 A smaller but still significant part of the
profession also finds "dynamic" or evolutive statutory interpretation a legiti-
mate means of interpreting a statute to meet current legal and social needs, even
if this works some activist "updating" of the statute.9"
Purposive or dynamic interpretation is arguably quite consistent with the
Southland result. The Arbitration Act was designed to ensure that courts did
not "discriminate" against arbitration agreements so that national commercial
needs might be served. Under these circumstances, a reading of the statute that
also forbids state legislative discrimination against arbitration may not be inevi-
table, but it is hardly the most serious mistake the Supreme Court has made in
this area.
To some degree, of course, statutory interpretation is a matter of taste. My
tastes run more toward purposivism and dynamism, particularly if this is not
inconsistent with statutory text or legislative intent. On this basis, I have
argued that Section 1 of the Arbitration Act, which makes arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts unenforceable, should be interpreted to protect
all workers, not merely those directly involved in the transportation industry.9
Case law to the contrary was based on an arguable (but probably incorrect and
excessively narrow) interpretation of the legislative history of the Act.92 Sec-
tion 1 was added at the behest of the Seamen's Union of America, ergo (reason
these cases) Section 1 must apply only to sailors or similarly mobile workers.9 3
At the risk of repeating myself, I can only reiterate that I find this to be eighth
grade sort of hyper-narrow, formalist, simplistic reasoning.94 Nonetheless, this
reasoning and this line of cases carried the day in 2001 when the Court ruled
that Section 1 does not protect a worker in a retail electronics store from the
force of an arbitration agreement that was standardized, adhesive, and a condi-
tion of employment.9 5
What's wrong with this picture (besides the obvious problem that it, by
judicial interpretation, takes away worker protection obtained in the legislative
process to expand arbitrability and private sector power, an issue upon which
Carrington and I agree)? To me, the problem is not so much that the Court
interpreted dynamically in Southland v. Keating96 but that it inconsistently took
a different, static approach in Circuit City v. Adams9 7 by focusing on perceived
specific legislative intent, notwithstanding the broad language and purpose of
89 See HENRY M. HART JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1957); NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (6th ed. 2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
90 See GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-43 (1982); Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
91 See Stempel, supra note 74.
92 Id. at 263-72.
93 Id. at 264-65. See, e.g., Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of
Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
94 See Stempel, supra note 74, at 280-302.
95 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). See also SINGER,
supra note 89, at §47.17.
96 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
97 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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the statute. In other words, the Court seems to employ whatever methodology
results in a victory for the party drafting the arbitration agreement and control-
ling the situation. The problem is not purposivism or dynamism - it is
favoritism.
Carrington also argues that the Court's famous 1938 decision of Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins9 8 should have forced a rethinking and rewriting of the Arbi-
tration Act.99 Carrington reasons that since Erie eliminated the general federal
common law regime of Swift v. Tyson, Erie must also foreclose an interpreta-
tion of the Act that creates a federal common law of arbitration.' ° ° This is
interesting but strained. The Rules of Decision Act, the law interpreted by
Erie, does say that, in diversity cases, the rules of the states shall be the sub-
stantive rules of decision - unless Congress has acted.
D. Not All Law Affecting Arbitration is Anti-Arbitration
One can legitimately argue that the Arbitration Act is such congressional
action that was not designed to displace state law entirely. The Act is not an
independent ground for jurisdiction.' 1 Thus, the Act does not create federal
question jurisdiction, making it more difficult to argue that the Act was
designed to impose a federal rule of arbitration. Thus, Carrington's critique of
Southland v. Keating and its reasoning gives me pause. Nonetheless, there
remains so much history of judicial hostility toward arbitration and of congres-
sional desire to alter that situation reflected in the legislative history of the Act.
Under these circumstances, despite Carrington's critique, it is hard to say that
Southland v. Keating is clearly wrongly decided; at least on the issue of
whether the Act creates substantive federal law. Where the Court more argua-
bly erred was in its refusal to be willing to harmonize the substantive federal
law of the Act with state laws that are not anti-arbitration per se but seek to
vindicate another purpose and may, in some instances, restrict the operation of
a problematic arbitration clause.
What seems even more wrong is the formalist and aggressive attitude
taken by post-Southland courts toward state efforts to ensure that arbitration is
genuinely consensual and that arbitration agreements are not unconscionable.
The Court's 1996 opinion in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto'0 2 is perhaps the
most prominent example. However, other federal court decisions mirror
Casarotto in holding that any state law imposing any conditions on arbitration
constitutes an anti-arbitration law in violation of the Act. This approach is
simply too harsh, even though the Court has suggested that a general state law
that is not limited to arbitration would survive scrutiny even if it imposes
98 See 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) and holding
that there was no general federal common law applicable in diversity jurisdiction cases, but
that federal courts should apply the state law that would provide the rule for decision if
matter had been litigated in state court).
99 See Carrington, supra note 60, at 264.
100 Id.
'0' See Moses H. Cone Mem'i Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983).
1'2 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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requirements of disclosure or consent that may prevent enforcement of many
arbitration clauses.
10 3
Similarly wrong, as demonstrated by Carrington, is judicial failure to real-
ize that statutes passed subsequent to the Arbitration Act may make certain
disputes inarbitrable if the arbitration forum will not be adequate for a full
airing of the legal rights at stake. In making this point, Carrington is noting
something that the Court seems to have overlooked: more recent statutes take
precedence over older statutes if the laws are in conflict."° On this basis,
Carrington argues for the inarbitrability of claims made pursuant to the Auto-
mobile Dealers Day in Court Act of 1956;105 Petroleum Marketing Practices
Act of 1978;106 Truth in Lending Act of 1968;117 Magnuson-Moss Act of
1975; 108 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of
1970. 109
Carrington makes good arguments that cases under these statutes should
not be removed from the courts simply because of the Supreme Court's
"national policy" in favor of arbitration, a policy announced in 1984 on the
basis of a 1925 statute. Carrington's argument has particular force regarding
the Automobile Dealers Act that is, after all, a "day in court" statute.
E. Consent Should Still be "The" Question
However, I still find it hard to get excised about these situations - so long
as courts police contracts containing arbitration clauses so that we are confident
that the arbitration agreement was sufficiently knowing, voluntary, and reason-
able to merit enforcement. Carrington argues that arbitration is inconsistent
with the regulatory schemes established by all of these statutes but I somehow
remain skeptical.
Our system - both legal and economics - is one that vests a good deal of
discretion in private actors. If a party wants to sue, it need not obtain judicial
permission as a prerequisite. If a party wants to voluntarily dismiss it need not
have court permission if it acts with sufficient speed. If a party wants to settle,
the courts generally do not interfere. Not surprisingly, courts also are relatively
indifferent to a party's use of an alternative forum or procedure for resolving
the dispute. So long as neither party objects, the court will not forbid arbitra-
tion and require litigation. Disputants and citizens can waive even their most
precious constitutional rights, provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
In the case of contested pre-dispute arbitration agreements, little is differ-
ent except the problem of proof. If the facts establish that a party has agreed to
arbitrate rather than litigate, it is hard to discern any law or public policy
requiring litigation. One need not invoke a "national policy favoring arbitra-
tion" to get this result. One only need invoke the longstanding national policy
of individual autonomy over contract terms and disputing strategies.
103 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
104 See SINGER, supra note 89.
1o5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225; Carrington, supra note 60, at 268-71.
106 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806; Carrington, supra note 60, at 272-73.
107 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615; Carrington, supra note 60, at 273-74.
1o8 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301; Carrington, supra note 60, at 274-76.
109 See 18 U.S. §§ 1961-1968; Carrington, supra note 60, at 277.
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The problem, of course, is in determining whether a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement at issue was validly elected by the party that now contests the
arrangement. Was the objecting party defrauded, coerced, or misconstrued?
Or is it simply attempting to wiggle out of a deal? The answers to these con-
sent-related questions are more important than general legislative schemes
designed to create legal rights that, by default, are enforced in court if the par-
ties do not have an arbitration or other ADR agreement.
F. Arbitration Doctrine Reflecting Sociopolitical Trends
Seen in this light, Southland v. Keating does not seem so villainous. Even
as late as 1984, there were judicial and legislative impediments to arbitration
that could have been viewed by the Supreme Court as requiring a judicial pro-
nouncement that the Act was substantive and enforceable law. Seen in this
context, the Court's Southland decision seems reasonable. In retrospect, it may
appear that the Court leaned too far in favor of arbitration. But this perception
does not come from the national legal standard created by Southland's interpre-
tation of the Act. Rather, the current problems stem from the Court's consist-
ently formalist and crude conception of contractual consent.
Similarly regrettable, although a perhaps avoidable aspect of the litigation
zeitgeist, is the Court's tendency to lapse into a simplistic model of the world
and to embrace some arguments of interested parties as though they were scien-
tific axioms of truth. Carrington makes a convincing case that much modem
arbitration law is merely arbitration politics and another aspect of the prevailing
sociopolitical trends."' 0 The rise of ADR has taken place in a time when socio-
political opinion was also dominated by fawning veneration of markets and
extreme rhetorical attacks on government and regulation. As Carrington notes,
anything that smacks of judicial or even congressional regulation has been dis-
favored."' In this environment, the traditional role of government (and partic-
ularly courts) as protecting against sharp practices has faded severely, leaving
society the worse for it.
Between the time of the actual convening of this Symposium and the time
its scholarly papers go to press, the ravages of some of this excess have become
more apparent and worrisome. The stock market declined twenty to thirty per-
cent. Corporate CEOs have gone from being treated like rock stars to being
viewed as criminals. It indeed appears that some are criminals. Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,112 which restricted corporate govern-
ance prerogatives, expanded SEC powers, and effectively placed large auditing
firms under public control. Alan Greenspan has gone from deity to devil, or at
least to mere mortal.
Infatuation with arbitration and other private, non-judicial ADR is a piece
of this trend; like any trend (Carrington's analogy to the Dutch tulip bulb fanat-
11o See generally Carrington, supra note 60.
1 Id. at 259.
112 See H.R. 3763, P.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002).
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icism appears well-taken), 1 3 it can go too far and create new problems, new
backlash, and new desire for synthesis.
Although Carrington correctly points out that the Southland v. Keating
federalization of arbitration law is part of this era of uncritical praise of the
private, his fine paper nonetheless appears to overlook additional aspects of the
problem. On the one hand, Carrington correctly skewers the Supreme Court
and body politic for its de-regulative fetish. On the other hand, his solution to
the problem is more judicial decision making. But bad judicial decision mak-
ing is at the very root of modem ADR problems in which nonconsensual and
partisan arbitration arrangements may be crammed down the figurative throats
of society's less powerful, in situations far beyond those envisioned by the
enacting Congress. This may be dynamic statutory interpretation of a sort, but
it is retro-dynamism because of its regressive character.
Which is why I keep coming back (like a broken record voice in the wil-
derness) to the micro-matter of contract formation and construction rather than
the macro-issue of general systemic preferences for courts or arbitrators, public
or private. If arbitration clauses and their container contracts are properly con-
strued, I see nothing wrong with making the law of arbitrability a matter of
federal common law. Although this may not be the preferred interpretation of
Carrington and others, it is not an interpretation that is clearly foreclosed by
statutory language, legislative intent, historical background, or statutory
purpose.
Thus, despite the faults that Carrington correctly attaches to Southland, the
decision and its progeny could be rehabilitated through sounder statutory inter-
pretation and contract construction. The Federal Arbitration Act never man-
dated that courts forget about doctrines like adhesion, ambiguity, or
unconscionability. Nor did the Act remove the element of consent in contract.
Furthermore, the Act - even if treated as substantive federal law - is not nearly
so incompatible with state contract regulation as supposed by the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts. In this regard, the Supreme Court and others
have erred by equating any state law touching specifically on arbitration as
hostile to arbitration and in violation of the Act. Rather, the inquiry should
focus on whether state regulation is truly discriminating against arbitration or
is, instead, simply part of the state's general activity policing contractual
fairness.
G. Appreciating the Benefits of Arbitration
Notwithstanding all the force of the Carrington critique, a few good words
need to be said for arbitration. In the commercial context, they are not Kanga-
roo courts, at least not in the AAA arbitrations or court-annexed arbitrations
with which I am most familiar. One can even make a good argument that
arbitration is better for the "little guy" in these cases when we have a rather
conservative, formalist judiciary in federal courts and most states.
113 See Carrington, supra note 60, at 259-60, 280 (comparing American economic hubris of
the 1990s and dot.com bubble to Dutch Tulip craze and economic bubble of the Seventeenth
Century).
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Judicial traditionalists have traditionally criticized arbitration and other
forms of ADR as insufficiently attentive to the legal rights of disputants and
suggested that some disputants, particularly those with less social and eco-
nomic power, are disadvantaged by the rough justice, comprise character, or
emphasis on resolution (as opposed to evaluation) found in ADR.
Because arbitration is largely a less formal means of adjudication, it is
arguably less vulnerable to these criticisms than is mediation or mediation
hybrids, which promote resolution and de-emphasize evaluation and judgments
regarding the dispute. Certain arbitration forums, however, share some of this
ADR orientation. But popular perception of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, a large-scale provider of commercial arbitration, is that its arbitrations
adjudicate disputes (rather than compromise them) but that there is compromise
of sorts in that awards smooth out the rough edges and extremes thought to be
more common in the courts. For example, AAA arbitrations are significantly
less likely to result in creatively large compensatory damages awards, punitive
damages, or anything resembling injunctive relief.
Consequently, arbitration looks a lot like adjudication,1" 4 but with less
sophisticated adherence to the law. Under these circumstances, it is a bit over-
board for arbitration's critics to act as though the sky has fallen on disputants
who are forced to arbitrate rather than litigate. If the arbitrator is competent
and impartial, there is relatively little difference in the quality of decision-mak-
ing between arbitrators and courts. Although certain complex, specialized, or
emerging areas of the law may present particular issues, arbitration on the
whole brings socially acceptable adjudicative results if properly supervised by
the courts.
By proper supervision, I mean that courts must not let arbitrations become
kangaroo courts. In the 1980s initial rush of euphoria about arbitration, courts
seem to have shirked this role. However, the late Twentieth and early Twenty-
First Century have seen courts interceding to forbid or correct arbitral forums
that posed significant risk of unfairness to a disputant.115 Perhaps most notable
is judicial invalidation of the infamous arbitration clause issued by Hooters,
which essentially established an arbitration system in which employer Hooters
114 In fact, arbitration proponents have criticized the evolution of arbitration into a more
procedurally regulated, court-like process as arbitration has expanded and supplanted adjudi-
cation in many areas, such as securities brokerage disputes. See Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration
Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1433 (1996) (federal appellate
judge notes and criticizes tendency of arbitration to become more like adjudication through
accretion of additional formality).
115 See, e.g., Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000)
(arbitration clause not enforced because it gave employer complete right to alter forum and
procedure without notice to employee); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121
F.3d 1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 1997) (arbitration agreement that permits employer to change
terms at will is unenforceable); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (nonmutual arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable);
J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 49 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App. 2001) (arbitration clause unen-
forceable where one party has unilateral modification rights); Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc.
v. Bell South Mobility, Inc., 776 So.2d 589 (La. Ct. App. 2000). See also Duffield v. Rob-
ertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (unfair for employer to impose arbitra-
tion agreement as a condition of employment; arguably overruled by Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).
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was unlikely to ever lose a claim brought by an employee." 6 Less obviously
onerous arbitration provisions by employers with less problematic reputations
have also been subject to judicial policing." 7
So long as some significant judicial policing of arbitration clauses and
arrangements occurs with sufficient frequency, arbitration can result in deci-
sions equivalent in quality to those of courts. Although the Supreme Court's
interpretative jurisprudence (arbitration, contract, and statutory) of the past
twenty years has often been enough to make the strong weep, the future may be
better than the past. Scholarly analysis has consistently criticized the Court and
called for a more refined approach with more sensitivity to other legislation,
public policy, and a less formalist and textual construction of contracts and the
Act itself.' 8 Although the winners write history (and the winners dictate the
norms), all of this is unlikely to be lost on succeeding generations of judges,
lawyers, and the law students who will eventually ascend to higher influence in
law and politics. Ever the optimist, I foresee a more enlightened ADR Court as
membership in the Court changes over time and the Court is better informed on
the issues through new generations of law clerks and advocates with more
sophisticated views of ADR enforcement. It may not happen in the near term
of sharpened politics and occasionally blatant efforts to nominate predictable
judges and justices supportive of the nominator's preferred interest group, but
can occur in the long term.
Notwithstanding significant misgivings about the manner in which the
Court mandates arbitration, the profession should not forget that, despite flaws,
arbitration might result, on average, in better decisions than courts." 9 If the
topic of dispute is technical (e.g., engineering, construction, commodities trad-
116 See Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting as unconsciona-
ble arbitration provision that limited remedies and depositions as well as binding only
employee, among other abuses).
"17 See, e.g., Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (arbitration agree-
ment invalid where it was illusory, lacked mutuality, and was unsupported by consideration);
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (refusing to enforce relatively clear
and fair securities account arbitration provision due to lack of consumer choice vis-a-vis
standard contracts of other brokers). See also Buckner v. Tamarin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489
(2002) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement in medical malpractice wrongful death case
because decedent's signature did not bind survivors). But see EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding arbitration agreement for law
firm employee).
118 See, e.g., sources cited in notes 70-84, supra; Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration
Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal
for Change, 53 ALA. L. REv. 789 (2002); Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What
Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002); Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory
Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators,
87 IowA L. REv. 1337 (2002); Linda Alle-Murphy, Comment, Are Compulsory Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer Contracts Enforceable? A Contractual Analysis, 75 TEMP. L. REV.
125 (2002); Jeremy Kennedy, Comment, The Supreme Court Swallows a Legal Fly: Conse-
quences for Employees as the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act Expands, 33 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1137 (2002).
119 See Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
ing, financial instruments), an arbitration panel' 20 can be the equivalent of a
blue ribbon jury panel. In addition, the arbitration panel may interact with
counsel in a manner that clarifies the issues and proofs. By contrast, most
juries are prohibited from effectively asking questions or seeking clarification.
Neither can juries usually take notes. 121
Perhaps most important, if the object of dispute resolution is fairness and
justice, one can argue that arbitration is better prepared to dispense fairness and
justice because it is less bound by the letter of the law. The law may create
rights; on that the litigation romanticists are correct. But what they frequently
overlook is that the law often creates limits on recovery, technicalities that
stand in the way of justice, and bright line rules for decision that may be incon-
sistent with the equities of a case. These harsh formalities of litigation and
adjudication may fall particularly hard upon less sophisticated, less well-repre-
sented parties to a dispute. Consequently, arbitration may provide more satis-
factory results when it accords these parties rough justice.
Consider the example of a hypothetical employment discrimination claim.
In litigation, the claimant has a chance of winning big - but also has a not
insignificant chance of losing big and receiving nothing. Even a strong factual
case can be thwarted by a missed deadline or a legal stricture on recovery. In
arbitration, the same claimant may stand a better chance of some relief. It may
not be the degree of relief possible in litigation, but there may be less "down-
side risk" for the claimant.
Consider, too, the identity of the decision maker. Litigation advocates
have criticized the tendency of arbitrators to be white men from the business
community and suggested that these ADR adjudicators may not be as compe-
tent as courts for deciding matters, particularly claims such as employment dis-
crimination. However, these critics of arbitration - including Carrington to a
degree (although he is hardly a litigation romantic)12 2 - forget that the quality
120 On this point, I also have to take small issue with Carrington. He asserts that the norm
for arbitration is a single arbitrator and argues that a single arbitrator is more prone to error
or idiosyncratic perceptions than a panel of arbitrators or a jury. See Carrington, supra note
60, at 282, 283. Although the single-arbitrator norm governs for most "low-stakes" con-
sumer or small business arbitration such as controversies over credit card and other debt,
most commercial or securities disputes of any significance in my experience involve a panel
of three arbitrators, lessening Carrington's concerns and providing some cross-fertilization
of perceptions and expertise.
121 One aspect of disputing reform that consistently appears consistently to be undervalued
is trial reform in litigation. Permitting jurors to have comfortable seats, a flat surface on
which to write, the prerogative to ask questions and take notes, and streamlined trial events
might well produce faster, better, cheaper litigation dispute resolution.
122 Carrington served as Reporter of the U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on
the Federal Civil Rules, the group that largely considers and authors amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that capacity, Carrington frequently supported and
authored rule changes that were designed to respond to deficiencies of litigation. Even those
who on occasion disagreed with these efforts (me included) must concede that they were not
the work of someone blindly committed to the litigation status quo. Perhaps most notably,
Carrington presided over and authored the 1993 Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 11 that was
designed to correct problems arising with excessive use of and satellite litigation over the
1983 Amendment to Rule 11.
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of decision-making is comparative.' 2
3
Arbitration has other arguable advantages for many disputants because of
its less formal, rigid, and "legalistic" structure. In court, you can lose com-
pletely, even without a hearing. In arbitration, you at least get heard - which
may increase the equity of the proceeding. In arbitration, the decision maker is
more likely to be forced to confront the equitable nuances of a dispute. A court
has more options to essentially ignore these factors and render a pretrial deci-
sion as a matter of law. As for complex cases that turn more on legal points or
mixed questions rather than fact questions, arbitration may be more effective
because the proceeding is more attuned to having an exploratory conversation
about the points of dispute.
I say this with some irony. Arbitration is supposed to be less legal than
trial but may be better at dealing with the legal nuances. Consider the way
witnesses, particularly experts, are examined in court. This is not conducive to
telling and testing the story except by the theatrical means of cross-examina-
tion. In the less stylized and rigid form of proof at an arbitration hearing, the
witnesses, particularly experts, may be more fully heard and understood by the
decision-maker. Arbitrators are also not bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's
expert witness trilogy of Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Tire, which generally raised
barriers to expert testimony and makes it quite likely that a proffered expert
witness that would be heard in an arbitration would be barred from testifying in
federal court.
H. The Relative Comparison with Courts
It is not enough to find fault with arbitrators or arbitration. One must
compare it to the alternative in order to evaluate it. With arbitration, the obvi-
ous yardstick for comparison is litigation. If one's concern is fairness, justice,
adequate solicitude for the legal and equitable interests of the less powerful,
and vindication of public policy against discrimination or other deprivations of
civil rights, one can make a good case that federal courts are not necessarily
superior to arbitration. The history of courts during the post-Southland period
has largely been one of contracting the rights of claimants or raising their barri-
ers to relief. 124 The Supreme Court got so carried away in this endeavor
regarding employment discrimination and civil rights that a relatively conserva-
tive Congress was moved to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991.125 The Court's
preferential treatment of benefit plans subject to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (a statute Congress intended to protect the pen-
sion benefits of workers rather than to make it harder for them to collect prom-
ised health care benefits) spawned over forty states' statutes designed to protect
123 However, when the topic of the dispute moves away from traditional commercial issues,
there is ample cause for concern that arbitral and other ADR forums are less favorable to
those with lower social capital. See, e.g., Katherine Eddy, Note, To Every Remedy a Wrong:
The Confounding of Civil Liberties Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 776-77 (2001) (noting that only six percent of arbitrators
on AAA panel list are women).
124 See Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts, supra note 3.
125 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens,
and a Misleading Theory of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 583 (1991).
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employee insureds from unreasonable conduct of HMOs and other health insur-
ers. 126 In 2002, the Court permitted these plans to remain in force, but only by
a 5-4 vote. 12
7
One need not be a radical leftist to conclude that the current Supreme
Court, and much of the federal judiciary, is no friend to the consumer, civil
rights claimant, or small debtor. One need not be a rampaging legal realist to
realize that conservative political forces have made a concerted effort during
the past twenty years to appoint judges with judicial philosophies favorable to
the very big business interests about which Carrington is (correctly) so con-
cemed (e.g., automobile manufacturers, oil producers and refiners, manufactur-
ers of consumer goods, lenders, creditors, and businesses that cut close to the
line regarding fraud, misrepresentation, self-interest, breach of fiduciary duty,
preferential treatment for insiders, and the limits of the securities laws).' 2 8
Although liberal political forces have also played this game, they have
done considerably less well. Ronald Reagan elevated William Rehnquist to
Chief Justice and appointed Antonin Scalia to the Court. The first President
Bush appointed Clarence Thomas (although this was tempered by his appoint-
ment of David Souter). Bill Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Ste-
phen Breyer. As the cliche goes, "do the math." The three conservative
appointees lean dramatically more to the right than the three "moderate-liberal"
appointees lean to the left. The then-Democratically controlled Senate refused
to confirm District of Columbia Appeals Court Judge Robert Bork's nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court, but like most of the liberal action in this area has
been reactive and defensive rather than proactive and offensive. "Borking"
became part of the national vocabulary not because it represented the actual
confirmation process but because conservatives coined the term as part of their
effort to argue that Bork had been unfairly treated, even smeared.
This pattern has largely been replicated in the lower federal courts. Ron-
ald Reagan and the two George Bushes have sought to fill the bench with dis-
tinctly conservative jurists. Bill Clinton appointed judges that were more
moderate and on occasion even liberal, but did not actively seek to recalibrate
the bench after the Reagan-Bush years (in part no doubt because the Republi-
can Senate, led by Judiciary Chair Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) would not let him).
Recent events suggest the trend and attendant battle lines continue.
Recently, the Senate rejected (largely on party lines) President Bush's nomina-
tion of Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen for the Fifth Circuit.'2 9
Although this is a "victory" for "the left," it was a minor, reactive victory and a
126 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (noting existence of
these HMO review statutes and upholding Illinois statute of this type, but only by 5-4 vote);
Jeffrey W. Stempel & Nadia von Magdenko, Doctors, HMOs, ERISA, and the Public Inter-
est After Pegram v. Herdrich, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 687 (2000) (reviewing Court's historically
broad, problematic reading of ERISA as preempting many state laws designed to protect
consumers).
127 See Moran, 536 U.S. at 355.
128 See e.g., Carrington, supra note 60, at 259-60.
129 See Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Says His View Will Not Sway Him on Bench, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 19, 2002, at 30A, col. I (describing pending appointment controversy over
Tenth Circuit nominee University of Utah College of Law Professor Michael McConnell as
well as Senate rejection of Justice Owen's nomination).
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temporary respite. The ideological "story" of the federal courts today is that.
President Bush chose to seek to elevate Owen, one of the most conservative
state court justices or judges one could find. Although news accounts of the
Senate's rejection of Owen centered on her opposition to abortion and arguable
efforts to support state interference with federal abortion rights, her body of
work as a Texas Supreme Court Justice suggests she never met a defendant she
did not like, or at least favor over the competing plaintiff.
If Justice Owen had become Judge Owen, a renewed possibility as the
President has again brought forth her name, she would be unlikely to provide
the sort of protection to retail auto dealership franchises, debtors, gas station
franchisees, consumers, and other "little guys" about whom Carrington is
rightly concerned. Further, although Owen is conservative, she may only
barely outpace many other jurists favored by the recent presidents, governors,
or voters (in states with an elected bench). For example, the Texas Supreme
Court on which Owen sits has several other extremely conservative justices and
has not been a friend to the groups about which Carrington is concerned.
The unspoken assumption of the Carrington critique is that courts are bet-
ter than arbitrators in terms of accuracy and empathy. The assumption proba-
bly is wrong, at least in many cases. Although I would not want to appear
before kangaroo court arbitrators in the hip pocket of a large, well-financed,
repeat-player opponent, neither would I be very excited about appearing before
many federal and state judges concerning the same case. There are, however, a
large number of white, male (probably Republican and politically conservative)
arbitrators on the AAA or New York Stock Exchange list who would give my
hypothetical case a fair hearing. I might not have much success with a punitive
damages claim, but neither would I be as likely to be dismissed without any
remedy.
L Arbitration and Inconvenience: Time to Revive an Old Defense?
In his discussion of the Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth case,
1 30
Carrington makes a good case that the geographic inconvenience and expense
imposed on a retail auto dealer may be insurmountable, particularly where the
matter is to be arbitrated in Japan, a country with rather different views of the
antitrust laws than those found in American courts. But is even this situation as
bad as Carrington paints? Although expensive, does foreign arbitration really
mean you need to run up the white flag? I think not. Although arbitration in
Japan gives one party a logistical and economic advantage, the key question is
whether the forum is fair. If courts were to properly police this aspect of arbi-
tration (as have many courts below the Supreme Court), many of the concerns
about arbitral results can be alleviated, even in those situations that provide
Carrington with his strongest arguments against the Court's modern endorse-
ment of arbitration.
Nonetheless, Carrington raises an excellent point that would be well worth
more serious examination by courts as part of their arbitrability analysis. Is
arbitration abroad suspect? How often is a foreign-based arbitral forum
130 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
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unfairly stacked against the American claimant, either because of outright bias
or implicit norms that improperly defeat the expectations of the claimant?
Here, it is important to distinguish between foreign and domestic arbitration.
Although many non-American arbitration forums may be problematic, most
domestic arbitrations are (or can easily be made to be) essentially fair and
impartial. The determination, as always, is one dependent on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case. Consequently, what is needed is not a broad
endorsement of condemnation of arbitration but serious judicial inquiry into the
fairness of the arbitral forum when this is legitimately challenged by the party
resisting arbitration.
To the extent that geographic inconvenience imposed by arbitration is a
genuinely real problem for one disputant, the Court could revive in modified
form the "seriously inconvenient forum" defense to arbitrability. Justice Hugo
Black was a powerful exponent of this view.131 Unfortunately, he took it to
populist extremes, suggesting that anything but local arbitration was unfair for
consumers. 3 ' Nonetheless, Black was on to something. The federal courts
could legitimately invoke a moderate form of his approach without undermin-
ing basic principles of contract enforcement.1 33
For the immediate future, Carrington's idea of seizing on Breyer's sugges-
tion of broad contract fairness provisions is a good one. In effect, the harshness
of the Court's rejection of state law efforts to police arbitration serve as an
invitation for the states to better police all contracts in order to promote disclo-
sure, consent, and fairness. In this regard, the sins of arbitration may lead to
redemption of contract law in general.
IV. THE LOST-FOuND-LoST ART OF NEGOTIATION
A. Modern ADR Movements on Separate Tracks
All of the excellent professors in this Symposium make insightful observa-
tions about various forms of ADR (mediation and "medigation," judicial sig-
naling, and arbitration) and also ways in which these activities can be improved
and controlled as necessary to increase the efficacy of the entire disputes reso-
lution system. However, only Subrin's article touches upon an overarching
point that, in my view, has received insufficient attention in the academic
literature.
Most of the academic and judicial attention to ADR since the time of the
Pound Conference has focused on ADR procedures or methods that involve use
of a third party: arbitration; mediation; early neutral evaluation; hybrids (med-
arb; summary jury trial). Judicial signaling obviously involves a third party
(the judge). On one level, all this attention to ADR is wonderful (despite the
131 See, e.g., Moseley v. Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
132 See id. at 171 (suggesting a near phobia about ability of New York-based tribunal to
fairly hear the contentions of a southerner). See also Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that appointment of agent for receipt of
service inherently unfair in that it will force residents of rural areas to come to New York or
other urban areas for dispute resolution).
133 See Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, supra note 62, at 1397-99 (seriously
inconvenient forum may be grounds for refusing to enforce arbitration agreement).
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overly romantic views of the matter by some 1 4 and the tendency of some ADR
scholarship to engage in excessive litigation-bashing). But on another level,
this trend has been unfortunate in that it overlooks the leading source of dispute
resolution: negotiation.
Ironically, the upsurge in ADR scholarship and judicial promotion of
ADR has arisen during an era when negotiation has received more theoretical
and academic attention. Contemporaneous with the Pound Conference, court-
annexed arbitration, and greater judicial support for ADR was the Harvard
Negotiation Project and its best-selling manifesto for improved negotiation,
Getting to Yes, first published in 1981. During the past twenty years, negotia-
tion has received increasing interest in the legal academy. Two recent schol-
arly treatments of negotiation are particularly strong,' 35 but are hardly alone in
providing insights about negotiation and raising public consciousness about
negotiation.
What seems discordant is that there is relatively little overlap between the
ADR communities and the negotiation communities in terms of curriculum,
scholarship, or interaction on projects and initiatives. Although I may simply
be failing to keep sufficiently abreast of developments in this field, it appears as
though third-party ADR and bi-party negotiation exist in separate orbits.
Although this may be inevitable in an age of specialization and division of
labor (securities lawyers do not regularly talk shop with employment law-
yers), 13 6 it is arguably detrimental to the overall health of the dispute resolution
system. By treating ADR as something quite separate from negotiation, a cli-
mate has been fostered in which many cases, capable of bi-lateral resolution
early on, fail to get resolved until an ADR event with a third-party neutral takes
place. Although this may be better than a full-dress trial on the matter (perhaps
with appeal), it is probably not nearly as good for the parties or society as an
earlier negotiated resolution (assuming, of course, that one party does not take
undue advantage of another during the negotiation).
Perhaps worse, the overall consumption of resources spent on dispute res-
olution may even see a net increase if ADR simply becomes another unavoida-
ble step on the road to resolution. Although mediation may settle cases in the
134 See Carrington, supra note 60, at 287 (concluding that many of the proponents of ADR
have been "ill-used" by special interests that have used modem ADR movement to justify
deprivation of fair hearing to consumers and others).
135 See KOROBKIN, supra note 49; MNOOKIN, ET. AL., supra note 49.
136 This certainly applies to the professoriate as well. Legal scholars tend to be focused on
their own work and extensive collaboration is rare. Perhaps the most memorable example
took place at Harvard Law School in the late 1960s. In one office, Professor Robert
Braucher was serving as Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which arguably moved mainstream contract law from the formalism of Williston
to the functionalism of Corbin. In an office a few doors down, Professor Robert Keeton was
working on an article that would launch the "reasonable expectations doctrine" for insurance
law, arguing that in some cases a policyholder's objectively reasonable expectations as to the
coverage provided in a policy should control over even clear policy language to the contrary.
See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With the Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961 (1969-1970). To say the least, Keeton was arguing for a strong shift of insurance law in
the direction of Corbin's view of contract law. But according to available information,
Braucher and Keeton never talked about their separate but quite related projects while work-
ing on them.
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mid-to-latter stages of litigation, it is not at all clear that these same settlements
would not take place at a final pretrial conference, perhaps with judicial signal-
ing. Under those circumstances, the mediation has arguably increased costs
and delay, perhaps with no corresponding benefit of better settlements or more
cathartic exchange between the parties.
In other words, I am wondering if the ADR movement has created new
hurdles on the road to dispute resolution even while the negotiation movement
has been providing lawyers and disputants with good advice useful in resolving
disputes with less cost, delay, and acrimony. To avoid this potential negative
result, the legal profession - particularly the judiciary - might better serve soci-
ety by trumpeting negotiation more and pushing third-party ADR processes or
events less. 131
B. Legal Education and the Historical Oversight of Negotiation
Legal educators cannot escape criticism in this regard. We must ask our-
selves whether our greater fixation on ADR processes and institutions has dis-
served the profession and society by making resort to these ADR events more
necessary because we have failed to adequately orient and train students for
negotiation.
For example, the Boyd School of Law devotes six credit hours (rather than
the more typical 4-5 credit hours) to the first-year civil procedures class, which
is denominated "civil procedure/ADR." Although we can give ourselves an
institutional pat on the back for emphasizing ADR in the core curriculum more
than many schools,' 38 I doubt that we devote the equivalent of a full credit hour
to ADR. I know that I do not and it appears that my colleagues do not, either.
Rather, there is a tendency to use a good deal of the additional credit allocation
for a more in-depth look at civil procedure that is, of course, litigation.
In this context, students can understandably be forgiven for perhaps view-
ing ADR (especially court-connected ADR) as another procedural event in liti-
gation. As Subrin points out, attorneys have perhaps tended to be more
litigation oriented for a mix of sociological reasons (less cohesion in the bar;
"scrappy," combative personality ethos among litigators, particularly older gen-
eration of "outsider" attorneys who needed an edge to make their way in the
legal world). 139
13I This applies regarding arbitration as well. If the enforceability of an arbitration agree-
ment is vigorously litigated, the net costs of dispute resolution may increase rather than
decrease, even if the case is ultimately arbitrated rather than litigated.
138 ADR and lawyer problem solving is emphasized from the outset for incoming students
at the Law School's "Introduction to Law Week" as well as throughout the three semesters
of "Lawyering Process" required for graduation.
"I See 3 NEV. L.J. at 205, 207-08. Although some may cringe at Subrin's abbreviated
characterization of the social class history of lawyers, I find his candid insight holds a good
deal of explanatory power and is also consistent with more extensive research on the topic.
See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976) (describing initial waspy establishment of East Coast bar in Nineteenth
Century and its hostility as those of different ethnic and social background joined the profes-
sion); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce, & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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1084 (1983) (noting that some of bar's opposition to lawyer advertising was in reaction to
efforts by outsider attorneys to gain business through advertising).
The discrimination Subrin describes by the Boston Brahmin firms against Jewish attor-
neys was replicated throughout the country during the early-mid Twentieth Century. For
example, the Minneapolis firm in which I was once an associate was founded by Samuel
Maslon, a Harvard Law graduate (and Law Review member) who returned to his hometown
fresh from a clerkship for Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis only to be spurned by the
established law firms in town. To some extent, Maslon had the last laugh by establishing an
elite law firm (Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand) that remains among the state's most
prominent. Maslon did not succeed by being a shrinking violet. Although he was inactive
by the time I joined the firm, the stories of his workaholic toughness remained legend in the
firm. However, he was also known for his pragmatism in seeking to further client ends
without undue litigation. But he clearly did this the old-fashioned way: bargaining in the
shadow of litigation or potential litigation rather than mediating through third party neutrals.
On the issue of civility, I again question the conventional wisdom. In my years of
practice and continuing bar association work, consulting, or expert witness activity, I have
not seen anything to suggest that older lawyers consistently display more civility than
younger attorneys. To the contrary, most of the loud, difficult, table-pounding counsel I
have seen have been more senior attorneys. Many of them, consistent with Subrin's thesis,
would be proud of their behavior, regarding it as "real lawyering." Shifts in professional
attitudes may make for less combativeness and more mediation. But a more civil profession
is not necessarily a more ethical profession. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent:
The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Pro-
fession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25 (1999) (economic pressures are tempting attorneys to cut
ethical comers but not necessarily to act with less civility).
Subrin's anecdotal information also raises another issue - the romance and nostalgia we
often erroneously attach to law practice in bygone days. Much of today's legal literature
suggests that lawyers in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century enjoyed considera-
bly more balance between work and personal or civil pursuits. See, e.g., ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M.
LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Elizabeth A. Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal
Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each Passing Hour, 20 STETSON L. REV. 419, 423
(1991). The conventional wisdom is also that lawyers of bygone days also had greater
"civility" than the purported "Rambos" of the modem era. See ABA COMMISSION ON PRO-
FESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) as well as Kronman, Linowitz & Mayer, Kovachevich &
Waksler.
Based on may own experience, this may well be a falsely nostalgic picture. As to
workaholism: although large law firms may have racheted up their expectations of associ-
ates, this does not mean the average lawyer is working more hours. Most lawyers, now as
then, work in small offices or even as solo practitioners. Based on my conversations through
the years with older (often now deceased) attorneys, it appears the successful small firm
lawyers of a century ago routinely worked the eighty-hour weeks of which large firm associ-
ates now complain. The old guard also worked without computers, word processors, voice
mail, email, and express delivery services. Although they may not have always been effi-
cient or optimally productive under those circumstances, one can easily see that they were
probably in the office more than one would think based on the popular image of the 1950s
Ozzie Nelson (non-lawyer) father. See ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER:
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964); QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HoPsONG, JR.,
LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK (1967).
This raises another point touched on by Subrin. Women have entered the legal profes-
sion in substantial numbers during the past thirty years. In society as a whole, we have more
two-income couples and more lawyer-lawyer couples. In these relationships, seldom found
in the first half of the Twentieth Century, there simply is not the same potential for an
attorney (usually male) to work the same bone-numbing hours that appear to have been put
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In addition, negotiation is largely not taught in the first year curriculum.
Although negotiation may be part of isolated class exercises, role-playing, or
discussion, the major casebooks and the typical course syllabus do not devote
any significant, separate attention to negotiation. This is true of even the new-
est casebooks.' 4 ° For example, in Subrin's excellent civil procedure
casebook,14 ' there, are by my reckoning, approximately eighty pages (of a
1,200 page book) devoted to ADR and attendant issues (e.g., the adversary
system, litigation crisis, managerial judging). 4 2 There really is not a specific
discussion of negotiation. 1
4 3
Undoubtedly, Subrin, his co-authors, and other casebook authors would
respond that they were not writing negotiation books but casebooks dealing
with the traditional first-year subject matters in question. Although this is a
pretty strong rejoinder to my criticism, it does not necessarily refute the criti-
cism and its implications for legal education. Civil Procedure is, for example,
traditionally a course about litigation in federal court. But Subrin and his co-
authors managed to effectively devote something approaching ten percent of
the casebook to ADR, which is not about federal court litigation procedure.
Although negotiation is not part of litigation procedure per se, it is about dis-
pute resolution and arguably accounts for much more dispute resolution than is
accomplished through the ADR methods that are now part of Subrin's and
other civil procedure casebooks. 144
The legal academy should ask itself whether law schools failed, to some
extent, by making the mediator necessary, just as they may have "failed" in an
earlier era by presenting litigation as the exclusive means of dispute resolution.
Greater emphasis on negotiation in the law school curriculum may serve the
useful purpose of reducing "unnecessary" mediation or ADR as well as "exces-
in by traditional lawyers of 50 to 150 years ago. This may also contribute to a degree to the
success of mediation and ADR. A less litigious approach may make for more sanity in
counsel's personal life.
140 See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL, & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, MAKING
AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT (2002). Despite the provocative, negotiation-
friendly title, this well-done new contracts casebook is largely addressing the "deal making"
of contract formation rather than negotiation over the parameters of the contractual "deal" or
negotiating a resolution of disputes arising out of a contract. Although there is useful discus-
sion of the law's "considerable freedom for the party's lawyer to help structure the transac-
tion in a manner that best serves the client's interest" (id. at 1127), negotiation theory,
methodology, and technique are not discussed at any length.
141 See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINow, MARK S. BRODIN, & THOMAS 0. MAIN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT (2000).
142 See id., ch. 6.
143 The closest encounters with pure negotiation are several excerpts on articles about the
adversary system, a piece discussing some of the problems of court-connected ADR (see
Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169 (1993), reprinted in Subrin
et al., p. 602), and Owen Fiss's noted defense of adjudication, which is, of course, a mani-
festo against negotiated resolution of disputes. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), reprinted in SUBRIN ET AL., p. 594.
144 See, e.g., JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & JOHN E. SEX-
TON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 1997); RICHARD L. MARCUS, MAR-
TIN H. REDISH, & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed.
1995).
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sive" litigation. One option is to try to introduce negotiation into the first-year
curriculum, just as ADR has been introduced to the basic course on civil proce-
dure. Another route is the regular offering of - and perhaps even mandatory
enrollment in - a basic course on negotiation or a course that will require stu-
dents to learn negotiation.
The academy has adopted ADR notwithstanding some significant schol-
arly concern over ADR efficacy. It seems odd that negotiation appears to have
received comparatively less attention than ADR,' 45 particularly since a modern
upsurge of scholarly writing about negotiation parallels the rise of the modern
ADR era. As Subrin notes (and I agree), the 1976 Pound Conference marks as
good a measuring stick as any for the beginning of the modern ADR movement
(as well as added impetus for the counter-revolution in civil procedure). 146 At
approximately the same time, the Harvard Negotiation Project was engaging in
the work that would result in publication of the seminal work Getting to Yes in
1981.147 During the past twenty years, substantial scholarly attention has been
paid to negotiation, creating a vibrant sub-field of the law.' 4 8 However, law
school course offerings have lagged in comparison while ADR offerings have
been in relative bloom. Law schools need to examine the degree to which their
priorities have been erroneously inverted. Perhaps negotiation is the horse and
third-party ADR the cart.
Of course, competent negotiation requires legal expertise, just as compe-
tent mediation or other ADR requires good lawyering skills and substantive
legal knowledge. It also requires courts to cast the shadow of the law that will
give rise to a framework for resolution.' 49 Subrin's prescriptive bottom line
holds for negotiation as well as mediation. Both will work better if courts stay
focused on their adjudicative mission rather than diluting it by trying to play
the dispute resolution roles better played by other institutional actors. To the
extent the judicial system engages in mediation or other ADR efforts, it would
better serve the public by doing this through the vehicle of different divisions
of a multi-door courthouse, as suggested by Frank Sander at the Pound Confer-
ence so many years ago.
150
145 Some law schools like Harvard, Stanford, Missouri, Ohio State and Pepperdine - all
schools noted for their ADR expertise - appear to have significant offerings in negotiation.
But these schools are exceptions and not the rule.
14 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 ro ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 297 (1996).
147 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHouT GIVING IN (1981). Getting to Yes has also been published in second and third
editions, most recently in 1997.
148 See, e.g., KOROBKIN, supra note 49; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 49.
149 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14. (observing that negotiation takes place
against a backdrop of party estimates of their respective legal entitlements and likely out-
comes if dispute is adjudicated to conclusion).
"0 See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Stem-
pel, supra note 146, at 361-95.
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V. NAGGING CONCERNS ABOUT FORUM FAIRNESS AND
DISPUTANT SATISFACTION
A. What Do Disputants Really Want?
Subrin's article argues forcefully that many of the criticisms of mediation
are overstated and that mediation cum medigation is a good thing.15 In her
comments upon these principle papers, Jean Sternlight has similar observations
and generally supports the growth of ADR but raises significant questions
regarding appropriate integration of ADR and traditional litigation. 52 The
ability of mediation to bring around even traditionalists like Subrin should not
blind us to the limitations of mediation and the utility of other means of dispute
resolution.
For some time, commentators have expressed reservations about media-
tion, suggesting that its lack of formality and rights-orientation may disadvan-
tage disputants with relatively less economic power or social capital.15 3
Sternlight and I share these concerns, 154 as does Subrin, although he argues that
the potential dangers can be controlled and that the potential benefits outweigh
the problems presented.' 5 5 I guardedly agree, provided that the dispute resolu-
tion infrastructure encourages mediators to contribute to the solution of fairness
rather than the problem of power differential.1 56 All participants in the debate
would agree that neither mediation nor arbitration is a good thing if it becomes
- or is perceived as - a biased forum.' 57
There is also another aspect of the evaluation that appears systematically
to be overlooked by the legal profession and judicial system even as scholarly
work has suggested that disputants may have more desire for the formal, rights-
based aspects of resolution rather than the peacemaking aspects of the process.
Perhaps most prominently, Deborah Hensler has suggested that the ADR move-
ment, particularly court-annexed mediation, has assumed without adequate
... See Subrin, supra note 5, at 215-16.
152 See generally Sternlight, supra note 40.
153 See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982) (contributors to
this anthology generally argue that formal procedure acts to level playing field among dispu-
tants of disparate power); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 444-46 (1992) (suggesting that de-emphasis of
legal rights in mediation disadvantages women due to power imbalance with husbands);
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545
1545-1610 (1991) (suggesting that more informal procedures of mediation may provide
insufficient protection to weaker parties such as women in many domestic disputes); Joseph
Singer, Nonjudicial Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on Justice for the Poor, 13
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569, 575 (1979) ("It is generally agreed that mediation between par-
ties of significantly unequal power is inappropriate.").
154 See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 300.
155 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 221.
156 See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 300-01; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 860
(2001); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 78-92
(2001).
157 Carrington's reservations about compelling arbitration would presumably be assuaged in
large part if arbitrators were both neutral in orientation toward the disputants and adequately
grounded in the legal and policy issues surrounding disputes.
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foundation that disputants prefer a non-adversarial process when they may, in
fact, prefer a decision on the facts and law of their dispute by a neutral decision
maker. 158
The work of Hensler and other legal and social scholars also suggests that
many disputants want to have a relatively formal and dignified hearing on their
dispute before a competent, unbiased decision maker - a "day in ADR" rather
than a day in court, if you will - and that they will accept this resolution with as
much or more satisfaction than results from non-adversarial processes. 59 The
latter may obtain a resolution, but perhaps does so at the cost of forcing a
disputant to feel it has pulled punches and been unable to voice its true con-
cerns and contentions.
Seen in this light, the case for streamlined adjudication of some disputes
(with true permission of the disputants) and ADR methods like arbitration
grows stronger relative to mediation. Similarly, the concept of the multi-door
courthouse gains currency as contrasted with the preferential promotion of
mediation. When even traditionalists like Subrin embrace mediation and criti-
cal commentators like Brunet endorse something called judicial mediation, we
may need to take the figurative step back and ask whether, by making judicial
activity less adjudicatory, we are actually undermining rather than enhancing
dispute resolution that is satisfactory to the participants.16 °
Reflecting on all of this brings to mind Laura Nader's longstanding "Peace
over Justice" critique of ADR. Nader has for years eloquently argued that too
much of the modem ethos of ADR has been aimed in the direction of achieving
agreement for agreement's sake. 16 ' This may lower the temperature of modem
158 See Deborah Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.
Disp. REs. 81, 94 (2002); Sternlight, supra note 40, at 297.
159 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 40, at 297-98; Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences:
Litigants' Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. Disp.
RESOL. 155, 163; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924, 944-47 (2000); Stempel, supra note 146, at
353 (quoting comments of Sociologist Craig McEwen at panel discussion); Craig A.
McEwen & Richard Maiman, The Relative Significance of Disputing Forum and Dispute
Characteristics for Outcome and Compliance, 20 LAW & Soc'y REv. 439 (1986). See also
Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out if It Is True: Comparing Mediation
and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 131.
160 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement
to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. Rav. 927, 950-51 (2002)
(suggesting that ADR has replaced segmented, hierarchal elements of litigation system with
similar elements of its own that aids business interests and some elements of personal injury
bar but does little for other litigants and may simply add to disputing burdens).
161 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 1
(1993). See also Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor King, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
99, 101 (1994).
ADR advocates, the people who followed the initial innovators, were so uncritical [of ADR].
[C]oercive harmony and, more generally, harmony ideology.., produces an environment which
discourages critical thinking, and which furthermore strips people of their rights as underwritten
in our less than perfect judicial system. In other words, like the judicial system, ADR has
problems. But unlike the judicial system, these problems and flaws are not made public [because
harmony ideology has made many observers blind to the flaws in ADR].
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disputing but also reduces the opportunity for illumination. Conflict is reduced,
but so is the quantum of judicial decision-making and its attendant contribu-
tions to social development.
This is not to say that the bulk of cases require adjudication, certainly not
full dress trial. Litigation romantics and ADR critics go too far in suggesting
that settlement or ADR peace is always antithetical to the use of law as an
instrument of social decision-making and progress (although, if Hensler is cor-
rect, non-adversarial ADR may still suffer from the problem of not really giv-
ing the litigants what they want).' 62 But this perspective must be appreciated
by the legal profession lest courts lose too much of their historical capacity to
articulate social values and make political decisions neglected or mishandled by
other branches of government.
B. When Resolution Clouds Rights: A Modest Illustration
Perhaps most important, the quest for consensus, problem solving, or
peace - and the ADR methods pursuing these goals - should not completely
lose sight of the legal rights and factual equities of a dispute. The "danger" is,
in my view, real indeed, as illustrated by an example.
The American Bar Association Law Student Division annually sponsors a
forensic competition (calling it "moot court" would be inaccurate) on negotia-
tion. As per my earlier comments in favor of more education about negotiation
rather than less, I generally applaud the advent and growth of the Negotiation
Competition.1 63 But the authors of the competition problems have, on occa-
sion, exhibited a disturbing tendency to design problems without much regard
for the practical factual and legal strengths and weaknesses of the disputants'
relative positions. The 2001 problems demonstrate this with some vengeance.
The Negotiation Competition proceeds by rounds in regional competi-
tions. The top teams in the regions go to the national round, usually held in
conjunction with the ABA mid-year meeting. For the Fall 2001 regional
rounds, the Round I problem involved negotiation of an executive employment
contract and was not just unproblematic but pretty good in terms of relative
balance between the sides. It was a realistic hypothetical not far removed from
real life and it lent itself to the problem solving style of modem negotiation,
with relatively little in the way of social or public policy stakes - and relatively
little shadow of the law in that the problem did not involve a concrete claim of
entitlement or for relief. Then came Round H.
In Round II, contestants were asked to assume that the employment con-
tract was agreed upon and that the mythical executive Susan Cromwell joined
the imaginary Macrotough, a large software business, as a District Manager.
Cromwell came into the job with, depending on one's perspective, a bit of a
hidden agenda or a heightened sensitivity about Macrotough's treatment of
women workers, as Macrotough was reputed in the industry to be a den of male
chauvinism. She hoped to move the company forward in this regard. Perhaps
162 See Hensler, supra note 158, at 94.
163 In addition, Boyd School of Law has had considerable success to date in its three years
of entering the Competition. One team tied for second, while two other teams finished near
the top of a twenty-eight team regional round. Most recently, two Boyd Law teams finished
first and second in the regional round and in the top ten nationally.
[Vol. 3:305
Winter 2002/2003] DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH ADJUDICATION 351
predictably, Cromwell came to believe the company was discriminatory and
that she was herself the victim of discrimination. Cromwell filed suit, hoping
to work toward class certification. According to the facts set forth in the Round
II Problem, Macrotough was sufficiently concerned about class liability and
bad publicity that it was prepared to offer as much as seventy million dollars to
settle the claims of Cromwell and all potential co-plaintiffs.
Unfortunately, however, the facts of Round II did not do much to establish
any discrimination or other wrongdoing by Macrotough. The hypothetical
problem refers vaguely and blandly to "a pervasive pattern of discrimination
and sexual harassment" but no specific facts are given. The ABA Round II
Problem thus was remarkably light on any evidence (direct or circumstantial)
that would support a finding of discrimination. Nonetheless, the instructions
for the problem direct Macrotough to throw money (up to seventy million dol-
lars) at Cromwell to make the case go away. As Fisher & Ury might say, the
ZOPA (zone of potential agreement)"" in Round I was substantial. Then
came Round III.
In Round I, we are asked to assume that Macrotough and Cromwell have
settled the Round II litigation and that Cromwell has returned to her job at
Macrotough. A week later, the company, for no apparent reason, sacks her,
obviously in retaliation for having instigated the earlier discrimination case.
The Company articulates its reason for discharge as "insubordination," with no
specific supporting information. This tends to make Macrotough look like a
dishonorable company that is quick to set forth a pretext for retaliation. Unlike
Round H, in which there were murky facts, Round III presents what certainly
appears to be a case of blatant, ugly, opportunistic, and mean discrimination by
a large, economically powerful actor. Of course, discrimination is illegal.
Retaliation is particularly contemptible because of its capacity to chill others
and deter their potential claims for relief if they face discrimination in the
future.
If Macrotough was on the hook for big money in Round II, one would
have expected the Round III Problem to authorize substantial payments or other
initiatives by Macrotough in order to resolve Cromwell's retaliation lawsuit.
Maybe not anything close to the seventy million dollars authorized for Round
H, but substantial, with some arguable penalty for bad behavior. Instead,
Round III calls for a maximum Macrotough offer of $350,000 that Cromwell's
negotiators are expected to extract if they wish to do optimally well in the ABA
Negotiation Competition. There is essentially no recognition of punitive dam-
ages or other significant injunctive relief as a possibility when a powerful com-
pany so blatantly discriminates in a manner so threatening to the law and policy
of the nation (Goliath can smote David and then pay comparatively little in
sanction).
In short, the ABA Negotiation Competition Round III Problem seems
hopelessly out of sync with the Round H problem, appears to minimize the
seriousness of Macrotough's hypothetical misconduct, and also minimized the
importance of the antidiscrimination values held by American law. Round III
is exactly the type of case for which Owen Fiss could mount the soapbox and
164 See FISHER & URY, supra note 14.
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insist on the social value of adjudication - or at least a civil plea bargain that
had some sting for the perpetrator and some vindication of legal and social
values. 1
65
Instead, the blatant Round III discrimination is treated as trivial compared
to the more ambiguous company conduct in Round II. Some of this undoubt-
edly stems from the individuality of Cromwell's retaliation claim versus the
potential aggregation of the Round II claims. Although this is, of course, a
legitimate factor for consideration in framing a settlement or negotiation pos-
ture, it does tend to send a message that the strength of the merits of an under-
lying case matters less than the mathematics of the dispute and the size of the
exposure created for a defendant. The net message is, in my view, not a good
one for those interested in law as a moral educator.
More important in the disconnect between Round II and Round III (in my
view) is that the problem-solving ethos of negotiation and ADR blinded the
author(s) of Problem III to the legal and moral issues presented by the retalia-
tion hypothetical. The heinous conduct of the company was comparatively
minimized, as were the undoubted emotions that must have arisen in plaintiff
Cromwell. Problem III expected Cromwell and Macrotough to make nice as
though they were coming together for the first time to work out the details of a
shared halftime program between two rival high school bands. It would be
more realistic to analogize the situation to a second encounter after one band
had refused to yield the field or even interfered with the other band's routine.
Under such circumstances, even high school students would be a bit more inter-
ested in standing on principle and exacting something in the nature of retribu-
tion or vindication rather than merely smoothing over past differences for a
comparatively modest fee.
In addition, as previously noted, "problem solving" usually only works
when all disputants are acting in good faith. The structure of Problem III and
the prior history of the parties strongly suggests that Macrotough is acting in
bad faith, yet Cromwell is still expected to have a warm and fuzzy encounter
with the company that has just stabbed her in the back. Nowhere in Problem III
is there any hint that Cromwell may be hopping mad and hungry for personal
vindication, punishment for Macrotough, or a legal and practical precedential
statement in support of anti-discrimination law. This is a Problem designed for
use in a competition sponsored by the nation's lawyers!!
Although others may disagree, I regard the 2001 Negotiation Competition
Problems as significant evidence of how quickly a peace-promoting ADR cul-
ture can drift quite rapidly away from the law and legal rights and focus myopi-
cally on resolution alone. Critics like Nader, Fiss, and Resnik are correct in
cautioning against this, but Subrin and Stemlight are correct in arguing that,
despite these dangers, ADR can avoid defanging the law and improve the over-
all quality of social disputing. As a practical matter, ADR has a functional
beachhead and is now as much a part of the system as litigation.' 66 It needs to
be harnessed, supervised, and properly administered rather than bashed. But
neither should ADR be permitted to undermine the fundamental pillars of the
165 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
166 See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 291.
[Vol. 3:305
Winter 2002/2003] DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH ADJUDICATION 353
legal regime with fuzzy thinking and a peacemaking ideology that unfairly sup-
presses adjudicative conflict resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION: SITING THE SYMPOSIUM IN THE LANDSCAPE OF ADR
My perhaps excessively alliterative title for this comment attempted to
make points that I hope have been supported in the body of the comment. Too
much discussion of both litigation and ADR tends to forget the lessons of the
past. Much of it, particularly the odes to ADR and the anti-conflict, anti-judg-
mental rhetoric is too fuzzy. Too little appreciation has been given to the
means by which litigation and ADR activities actually function. Proponents
and opponents seem endlessly to talk about ideal types rather than reality.
Negotiations in the field and its outcomes have not been sufficiently examined.
Enthusiasm for comparatively new modes of dispute resolution and docket
relief has led many, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, to minimize or over-
look issues of fairness. ADR has been surrounded by large doses of rhetoric
about freedom and self-determination, but ADR, in practice, reflects insuffi-
cient examination of the degree of freedom actually in evidence and the degree
to which it is mal-distributed according to class, status, wealth, race, and
gender.
At the end of this Symposium day, regarding the content of the papers
themselves, however, many of my comments are in the nature of quibbles
rather than fundamental criticisms. All three of the primary papers, as well as
the extensive Sterlight comments, make excellent, valuable, and timely obser-
vations about the current state of ADR. Further, all are consistent.
Subrin embraces mediation coupled with litigation, but concludes that this
will work best when courts engage in undiluted litigation, allowing mediation
to function best in its sphere. Brunet endorses the judicial prerogative of sig-
naling feedback on the law to help frame a dispute for greater ease and likeli-
hood of resolution. Carrington notes the importance of the substantive law and
illustrates the negative consequences that can ensue when the Supreme Court
becomes faddish and uncritical in its embrace of arbitration. Sternlight argues
for citing ADR selectively on the legal landscape and, much like Subrin, wants
courts to act like courts rather than ombudsmen.
All of these commentators argue that rigorous, relentless, rights-conscious,
traditional judicial activity will foster more effective operation of the emerging
fields of ADR. One can only hope that judges and policymakers are listening.
